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Summary
The Navy is currently procuring one Virginia (SSN-774) class attack nuclear-
powered submarine (SSN) per year.  Each submarine currently costs about $2.4
billion.  The FY2006-FY2011 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) submitted in
February 2005 proposes maintaining the one-per-year procurement rate through
FY2011 rather than increasing it two per year in FY2009, as previously planned.  A
30-year Navy force-level projection submitted in March 2005 shows the SSN force
declining from more than 50 boats today to 37 to 41 boats by FY2035.  Submarine
supporters are concerned that the Navy and DOD are not placing adequate emphasis
on attack submarines in Navy force-structure planning and ship-procurement plans.
Issues for Congress include the following: What should the attack submarine
force-level goal be?  At what rate should Virginia-class submarines be procured in
coming years?  Should the current joint-production arrangement for building
Virginia-class submarines be continued or altered? Should the Navy start design
work now on a new kind of attack submarine?  Congress’s decisions on these issues
could significantly affect future Navy capabilities, Navy funding requirements, and
the submarine industrial base.
In considering what the attack submarine force-level goal should be,  key factors
to consider include day-to-day demands for attack submarines, potential wartime
demands for attack submarines, submarine-launched unmanned vehicles (UVs),
attack submarine homeporting and crewing arrangements, the Trident cruise missile
submarine (SSGN) conversion program, and contributions by allied and friendly
attack submarines.
In considering the rate at which Virginia-class submarines should be procured
in coming years, key factors to consider include the attack submarine force-level
goal, attack submarine service lives, the effect of annual procurement rates on unit
procurement costs, industrial-base considerations, and funding requirements for other
defense-spending priorities.
Potential alternatives to the current two-yard, joint-production arrangement for
building Virginia-class boats include a one-yard production strategy under which
Virginia-class construction would be consolidated at either General Dynamics’
Electric Boat Division (GD/EB) or Northrop Grumman’s Newport News
Shipbuilding (NGNN), and a two-yard, separate-production strategy, under which
complete Virginia-class boats would be built at both GD/EB and NGNN.
One option for a new attack submarine design would be a non-nuclear-powered
boat equipped with an air-independent propulsion (AIP) system that would be
procured in tandem with Virginia-class boats.  Another option would be a reduced-
cost SSN using new “Tango Bravo” technologies being developed by the Navy that
would be procured as a successor to the Virginia-class design.  This report will be
updated as events warrant.
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Navy Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal
and Procurement Rate:
Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
The Navy is currently procuring one Virginia (SSN-774) class attack nuclear-
powered submarine (SSN) per year.  Each submarine currently costs about $2.4
billion.  The FY2006-FY2011 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) submitted in
February 2005 proposes maintaining the one-per-year procurement rate through
FY2011 rather than increasing it two per year in FY2009, as previously planned.  A
30-year Navy force-level projection submitted in March 2005 shows the SSN force
declining from more than 50 boats today to 37 to 41 boats by FY2035.  Submarine
supporters are concerned that the Navy and DOD are not placing adequate emphasis
on attack submarines in Navy force-structure planning and ship-procurement plans.
Issues for Congress include the following:
! What should the attack submarine force-level goal be? 
! At what rate should Virginia-class submarines be procured in
coming years?
! Should the current joint-production arrangement for building
Virginia-class submarines be continued or altered?
! Should the Navy start design work now on a new kind of attack
submarine?
Congress’s decisions on these issues could significantly affect future Navy
capabilities, Navy funding requirements, and the submarine industrial base.
The next section of this report provides background information on Navy attack
submarines and the Virginia-class program.  The following section addresses the
above issues for Congress.
Background
Submarines in the U.S. Navy
Types of Submarines.  Submarines are one of four principal categories of
combat ships that traditionally have helped define the size and structure of the U.S.
CRS-2
1 The Navy also includes mine warfare ships and a variety of auxiliary and support ships.
2 An exception for the U.S. Navy is the non-combat auxiliary submarine Dolphin (AGSS-
555), a small submarine that the Navy uses for research and development work.  As a non-
combat research asset, the Dolphin is not included in counts of the total number of
submarines (or battle force ships of all kinds) in the Navy.  Until the 1950s, the U.S. Navy
included many non-nuclear-powered combat submarines.  Following the advent of nuclear
power in the mid-1950s, construction of new non-nuclear-powered combat submarines
ended and the total number of non-nuclear-powered combat submarines in Navy service
began to decline.  The Navy’s last in-service non-nuclear-powered combat submarine was
retired in 1990.Most military submarines around the world are non-nuclear-powered.  Five
countries — the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), France, Russia, and China —
operate nuclear-powered submarines.  The latter three countries operate both nuclear- and
non-nuclear-powered submarines, while the United States and the UK operate all-nuclear
submarine fleets.  A submarine’s use of nuclear or non-nuclear power as its energy source
is not necessarily an indication of whether it is armed with nuclear weapons.  A nuclear-
powered submarine can lack nuclear weapons, and a non-nuclear-powered submarine can
be armed with nuclear weapons.
3 In the designations SSBN, SSGN, and SSN, SS stands for submarine, N stands for nuclear-
powered, B stands for ballistic missile, and G stands for guided missile (such as a cruise
missile).
4 For a discussion of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons policy and force structure, see CRS
Report RL31623, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force Structure, by Amy
F. Woolf. 
Navy.  The other three are aircraft carriers, surface combatants (e.g., cruisers,
destroyers, and frigates), and amphibious ships.1
Submarines are powered by either nuclear reactors or non-nuclear power sources
such as diesel engines or fuel cells.  All U.S. Navy submarines are nuclear-powered.2
U.S. Navy submarines fall into three types — nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarines (SSBNs), nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), and
nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs).3 
Submarine Roles and Missions.  The SSBNs’ basic mission is to remain
hidden at sea with their nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs) and thereby deter a strategic nuclear attack on the United States.  Although
this mission is often associated with the Cold War-era nuclear competition between
the United States and the Soviet Union, it has continued, with some modifications,
in the post-Cold War era.4  As of the end of FY2004, the Navy included 14 Ohio
(SSBN-726) class SSBNs, which are commonly called Trident submarines because
they carry Trident SLBMs.  Each Trident SSBN can carry 24 Trident SLBMs.
CRS-3
5 The Navy in the late 1950s and early 1960s built and operated two non-nuclear-powered
cruise missile submarines (or SSGs — the Grayback [SSG-574] and the Growler [SSG-577])
and one nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine (the Halibut [SSGN-587]).  The
submarines could each carry two Regulus II strategic nuclear cruise missiles.  In the mid-
1960s, following the deployment of the Navy’s initial SSBNs, the Regulus cruise missile
was removed from service and the Grayback, Growler, and Halibut were converted into
attack and auxiliary transport submarines.
6 For more on the Navy’s SSGN conversion program, see CRS Report RS21007, Navy
Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O’Rourke.
7 For an account of certain U.S. submarine surveillance and intelligence-collection
operations during the Cold War, see Sherry  Sontag and Christopher Drew with Annette
Lawrence Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff (New York: Public Affairs, 1998).
The SSGNs are a new addition to the U.S. Navy.5  They are former Trident
SSBNs that are being converted (i.e., modified) to carry Tomahawk cruise missiles
and special operations forces (SOF) rather than SLBMs. A total of four SSGNs are
planned; the conversions are scheduled to be completed between November 2005 and
September 2007.  Upon reentering service as SSGNs, the ships are scheduled to
remain in operation for about 20 years.6
Each SSGN as converted will retain its 24 large (7-foot-diameter, 44-foot-long)
SLBM launch tubes.  In one possible configuration, 22 of these tubes would be used
to carry a total of 154 Tomahawks (7 Tomahawks per tube) while the remaining two
would be used as lockout chambers for an embarked force of 66 SOF personnel.  In
the future, the 24 tubes could be used to carry large numbers of other payloads, such
as unmanned vehicles.  The SSGNs as converted will also retain their four original
21-inch-diameter torpedo tubes and their internal torpedo magazines.  In discussing
the SSGNs, Navy officials often express a desire to take maximum advantage of the
very large payload volume on each SSGN by developing new unmanned vehicles or
other advanced payloads.
The SSNs — the focus of this report — are general-purpose submarines that
perform a variety of peacetime and wartime missions, including the following:
! covert intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), much of
it done for national-level (as opposed to purely Navy) purposes;
! covert insertion and recovery of special operations forces;
! covert strikes against land targets with the Tomahawk cruise
missiles;
! covert offensive and defensive mine warfare;
! anti-submarine warfare (ASW); and
! anti-surface ship warfare.
During the Cold War, ASW against the Soviet submarine force was the primary
stated mission of U.S. SSNs, although covert ISR and covert SOF insertion/recovery
operations were important on a day-to-day basis as well.7  In the post-Cold War era,
although maintaining a capability for conducting anti-submarine warfare against the
Russian submarine force remains a mission, the Navy has placed increased emphasis
CRS-4
8 For the 80-SSN figure, see Statement of Vice Admiral Roger F. Bacon, U.S. Navy,
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare) in U.S. Congress, House Armed
Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials,
Submarine Programs, Mar. 20, 1991, pp. 10-11, or Statement of Rear Admiral Raymond G.
Jones, Jr., U.S. Navy, Deputy Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare), in
U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Projection Forces and
Regional Defense, Submarine Programs, June 7, 1991, pp. 10-11.
9 See Richard W. Mies, “Remarks to the NSL Annual Symposium,” Submarine Review, July
1997, p. 35; “Navy Sub Community Pushes for More Subs than Bottom-Up Review
Allowed,”  Inside the Navy, Nov. 7, 1994, pp. 1, 8-9; Attack Submarines in the Post-Cold
War Era: The Issues Facing Policymakers, op. cit., p. 14; Robert Holzer, “Pentagon Urges
Navy to Reduce Attack Sub Fleet to 50,” Defense News, Mar. 15-21, 1993, p. 10; Barbara
Nagy,  “ Size of Sub Force Next Policy Battle,” New London Day, July 20, 1992, pp. A1,
A8.
10 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, U.S. Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up
Review, Oct. 1993, pp. 55-57.
11 Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the
Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, pp. 29, 30, 47.
on missions that contribute to U.S. military operations in littoral (near-shore) areas
against regional adversaries other than Russia.
Although the four planned SSGNs differ somewhat from SSNs in terms of
mission orientation (with the SSGNs being strongly oriented toward Tomahawk
strikes and SOF support, while the SSNs are more general-purpose in orientation),
SSGNs are sometimes included in counts of the projected total number of Navy
attack submarines.
Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal
Previous Administrations.  The Reagan-era plan for a 600-ship Navy
included an objective of achieving and maintaining a force of 100 SSNs.  The George
H. W. Bush Administration’s proposed Base Force plan of 1991-1992 originally
called for a Navy of more than 400 ships, including 80 SSNs.8  In 1992, however, the
SSN goal was reduced to about 55 boats as a result of a 1992 Joint Staff force-level
requirement study (updated in 1993) that called for a force of 51 to 67 SSNs,
including 10 to 12 with Seawolf-level acoustic quieting, by the year 2012.9
The Clinton Administration, as part of its 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of
U.S. defense policy, established a goal of maintaining a Navy of about 346 ships,
including 45 to 55 SSNs.10  The Clinton administration’s 1997 QDR supported a
requirement for a Navy of about 305 ships and established a tentative SSN force-
level goal of 50 boats, “contingent on a reevaluation of peacetime operational
requirements.”11  The Clinton administration later amended the SSN figure to 55
boats (and therefore a total of about 310 ships).
The reevaluation called for in the 1997 QDR was carried out as part of a Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) study on future requirements for SSNs that was completed in
December 1999.  The study had three main conclusions:
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12 Department of Navy point paper dated Feb. 7, 2000.  Reprinted in Inside the Navy, Feb.
14, 2000, p. 5.
13 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review,  Sept. 2001, p. 23.
14 Bryan Bender, “Navy Eyes Cutting Submarine Force,” Boston Globe, May 12, 2004, p.
1;  Lolita C. Baldor, “Study Recommends Cutting Submarine Fleet,” NavyTimes.com, May
13, 2004.
! “that a force structure below 55 SSNs in the 2015 [time frame] and
62 [SSNs] in the 2025 time frame would leave the CINC’s [the
regional military commanders-in-chief] with insufficient capability
to respond to urgent crucial demands without gapping other
requirements of higher national interest.  Additionally, this force
structure [55 SSNs in 2015 and  62 in 2025] would be sufficient to
meet the modeled war fighting requirements;”
! “that to counter the technologically pacing threat would require 18
Virginia class SSNs in the 2015 time frame;” and
! “that 68 SSNs in the 2015 [time frame] and 76 [SSNs] in the 2025
time frame would meet all of the CINCs’ and national intelligence
community’s highest operational and collection requirements.”12
The conclusions of the 1999 JCS study were mentioned in discussions of
required SSN force levels, but the figures of 68 and 76 submarines were not
translated into official DOD force-level goals.
 
George W. Bush Administration.  The George W. Bush Administration’s
report on the 2001 QDR revalidated the amended requirement from the 1997 QDR
for a fleet of about 310 ships, including 55 SSNs.  In revalidating this and other U.S.
military force-structure goals, the report cautioned that as DOD’s “transformation
effort matures — and as it produces significantly higher output of military value from
each element of the force — DOD will explore additional opportunities to restructure
and reorganize the Armed Forces.”13
DOD and the Navy conducted studies on undersea warfare requirements in
2003-2004.  One of the Navy studies reportedly recommended reducing  the attack
submarine force level requirement to as few as 37 boats.  The study reportedly
recommended homeporting a total of nine attack submarines at Guam and using
satellites and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) to perform ISR missions now
performed by attack submarines.14
In March 2005, the Navy submitted to Congress a report projecting Navy force
levels out to FY2035.  The report presented two alternatives for FY2035 — a 260-
ship fleet including 37 SSNs and 4 SSGNs, and a 325-ship fleet including 41 SSNs
CRS-6
15 U.S. Department of the Navy, An Interim Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan
for the Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2006.  The report was delivered to the House
and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees on Mar. 23, 2005.
16 Robert A. Hamilton, “Delegation Calls Report on Sub Needs Encouraging,” The Day
(New London, CT), May 27, 2005; Jesse Hamilton, “Delegation to Get Details on Sub
Report,” Hartford (CT) Courant, May 26, 2005. 
and 4 SSGNs.15  Under these plans, SSNs would account for 14.2% or 12.6%,
respectively, of the total number of ships in the fleet.
In May 2005, it was reported that a newly completed DOD study on attack
submarine requirements called for maintaining a force of 45 to 50 boats.16
Attack Submarine Force Levels
Historical.  During the first half of the Cold War, attack submarines (both
nuclear- and non-nuclear-powered) accounted for an increasing percentage of the
total size of the Navy, increasing from roughly 10% of total battle force ships in the
early 1950s to about 17% by the late 1970s.  Since that time, attack submarines have
accounted for roughly 17% to 22% of total battle force ships.  At the end of FY2004,
they accounted for about 18.2% (53 ships of 291).
The SSN force included more than 90 boats during most of the 1980s, peaked
at 98 boats at the end of FY1987, and then began to decline.  The force included 85
to 88 boats during the early 1990s, 79 boats at the end of FY1996, 65 boats at the end
of FY1998, 57 boats at the end of FY1999, and 56 boats at the end of FY2000.  It has
since numbered 53 to 56 boats.
As of End of FY2004.  The 53 SSNs in service at the end of FY2004 included
the following:
! 1 Sturgeon (SSN-637) class boat;
! 50 Los Angeles (SSN-688) class boats; and
! 2 Seawolf (SSN-21) class boats.
A total of 37 Sturgeon-class boats were procured between FY1962 and FY1969
and entered service between 1967 and 1975.  The one Sturgeon class boat remaining
in service as of the end of FY2004 — the Parche (SSN-683), which entered service
in 1975 — was decommissioned on October 19, 2004.
A total of 62 Los Angeles-class submarines, commonly called 688s, were
procured between FY1970 and FY1990 and entered service between 1976 and 1996.
They are equipped with four 21-inch diameter torpedo tubes and can carry a total of
26 torpedoes or Tomahawk cruise missiles in their torpedo tubes and internal
magazines.  The final 31 boats in the class  (SSN-719 and higher) are equipped with
an additional 12 vertical launch system (VLS) tubes in their bows for carrying and
launching another 12 Tomahawk cruise missiles.  The final 23 boats in the class
(SSN-751 and higher) incorporate further improvements and are referred to as
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17 Los Angeles-class boats have a beam (i.e., diameter) of 33 feet and a submerged
displacement of about 7,150 tons.  Seawolf-class boats have a beam of 40 feet and a
submerged displacement of about 9,150 tons.
18 SSN-23 is 100 feet longer than SSN-21 and SSN-22 and has a submerged displacement
of 12,158 tons.
19 Virginia-class boats have a beam of 34 feet and a submerged displacement of 7,800 tons.
20 GD/EB and NGNN are the only two shipyards in the country capable of building nuclear-
powered ships.  GD/EB builds submarines only, while NGNN also builds nuclear-powered
aircraft carriers and is capable of building other types of surface ships.  The submarine
(continued...)
Improved Los Angeles class boats or 688Is.  As of the end of FY2004, 12 of the 62
boats in the class had been retired.
The two Seawolf-class submarines in service as of the end of FY2004 are the
Seawolf (SSN-21) and the Connecticut (SSN-22).  These boats were procured in
FY1989 and FY1991 and entered service in 1997 and 1998, respectively.  They are
larger than Los Angeles-class boats or previous U.S. Navy SSNs,17 and are equipped
with eight 30-inch-diameter torpedo tubes and can carry a total of 50 torpedoes or
cruise missiles.  The Seawolf class was originally intended to include about 30 boats,
but Seawolf-class procurement was stopped after three boats as a result of the end of
the Cold War and associated changes in military requirements.  The third and final
Seawolf-class boat, the Jimmy Carter (SSN-23), was originally procured in FY1992.
Its procurement was suspended and then reinstated in FY1996.  It was built to a
different (i.e., longer) configuration than the first two Seawolf-class boats, and was
commissioned into service on February 19, 2005.18
Virginia (SSN-774) Class Program
General.  The Virginia-class attack submarine was designed to be less
expensive and better optimized for post-Cold War submarine missions than the
Seawolf-class design.  The Virginia-class design is slightly larger than the Los
Angeles-class design,19 but incorporates newer technologies.  Virginia-class boats
currently cost about $2.4 billion each to procure.
Procurement Through FY2005.   The first Virginia-class boat was procured
in FY1998 and entered service on October 23, 2004.  As shown in Table 1 below,
a total of seven Virginia-class boats have been procured through FY2005.
Table 1. Virginia-Class Procurement, FY1998-FY2004
FY1998 FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
Joint Production Arrangement.  Virginia-class boats are built jointly by
General Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division (GD/EB) of Groton, CT, and Quonset
Point, RI, and Northrop Grumman’s Newport News Shipbuilding (NGNN) of
Newport News, VA.20  Under the arrangement, GD/EB builds certain parts of each
CRS-8
20 (...continued)
industrial base also includes scores of materials and parts suppliers, and laboratories and
research facilities, in various parts of the country.
21 For more on this debate and the legislation establishing the joint production arrangement,
see CRS Report RL30045, Navy Attack Submarine Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke. 
boat, NGNN builds certain other parts of each boat, and the yards take turns building
the reactor compartments and performing final assembly of the boats.  GD/EB is
building the reactor compartments and performing final assembly on boats 1, 3, and
so on, while NGNN is doing so on boats 2, 4, and so on.  The arrangement results in
a roughly 50-50 dollar-value division of work between the two yards and preserves
both yards’ ability to build submarine reactor compartments (a key capability for a
submarine-construction yard) and perform submarine final assembly work.
The joint production arrangement is a departure from past U.S. submarine
construction practices, under which complete submarines were built in individual
yards.  The joint production arrangement is the product of a debate over the Virginia-
class acquisition strategy within Congress, and between Congress and DOD, that
occurred in 1995-1997 (i.e., during the markup of the FY1996-FY1998 defense
budgets).  The goal of the arrangement is to keep both GD/EB and NGNN involved
in building nuclear-powered submarines, and thereby maintain two U.S. shipyards
capable of building nuclear-powered submarines, while minimizing the cost penalties
of using two yards rather than one to build a submarine design that is being procured
at a low annual rate.21
Deferral of Two-per-Year Rate.  The FY2004-FY2009 FYDP that the
Administration submitted to Congress in February 2003 projected increasing the
Virginia-class procurement rate to two per year starting in FY2007.  The amended
FY2005-FY2009 FYDP submitted in February 2004 delayed this projected increase
two years, to FY2009.  The FY2006-FY2011 submitted in February 2005 delays it
further, to a year beyond FY2011.  Table 2 below compares planned Virginia-class
procurement in the three FYDPs.
Table 2. Proposed Virginia-Class Procurement
FYDP FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11
FY2004-FY2009 FYDP (2/03) 1 1 1 2 2 2
FY2005-FY2009 FYDP (2/04) 1 1 1 1 2
FY2006-FY2011 FYDP (2/05) 1 1 1 1 1 1
Multiyear Procurement (MYP) for FY2004-FY2008.  As part of its
proposed FY2004 budget submitted to Congress in February 2003, the Navy
requested multiyear procurement authority (MYP) to procure a total of seven
Virginia-class boats during the five-year period FY2004-FY2008 (i.e., one boat per
year for FY2004-FY2006, then two boats per year for FY2007-FY2008, as shown in
the top line in the table above).  Congress, as part of its action on the FY2004 defense
budget, granted authority in appropriation bill language for a five-boat MYP during
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22 The Navy estimated that a seven-boat MYP arrangement would have reduced the cost of
the seven boats in question by an average of about $115 million per boat.
23 Section 8008 of the bill approves MYP authority for the Virginia-class program
“Provided, That the Secretary of the Navy may not enter into a multiyear contract for the
procurement of more than one Virginia Class submarine per year.”  For the bill and report
language on Congress’s decision, see H.Rept. 108-283 (FY2004 defense appropriations bill,
H.R. 2658/P.L. 108-87) pp. 20, 185-186.
24 The Administration’s FY1988 budget and FY1988-FY1992 FYDP proposed procuring
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this period (i.e., one boat per year for FY2004-FY2008).  The Navy estimates that the
five-boat MYP arrangement will reduce the total cost of the five boats by a total of
about $400 million, or an average of $80 million per boat.22
The five-boat MYP authority was accompanied by appropriation conference
report language that the Navy and other observers interpreted as strongly cautioning
the Navy against including funding in future budgets to support the procurement of
a second boat in either FY2007 or FY2008.23  Consistent with this interpretation, the
Administration’s amended FY2005-FY2009 FYDP includes funding for only one
Virginia class boat per year for the period FY2005-FY2008.
Option for Procuring Second Boat in FY2007 or FY2008.  Although
the FY2004 appropriation bill and report language may effectively discourage the
Navy from requesting funding in its budgets for a second boat in FY2007 or FY2008,
they do not necessarily prevent a future Congress from funding a second boat in
FY2007 or FY2008 that the Navy has not requested funding for, if a future Congress
wants to fund such a boat and determines that there is sufficient funding available for
the purpose.  A future Congress could alter the Virginia-class MYP authority to
permit a second boat procured in FY2007 or FY2008 to be covered under the MYP
contract.  Alternatively, it might be possible to build a second boat procured in
FY2007 or FY2008 under a non-MYP contract (i.e., a regular, single-boat
construction contract) that is separate from the MYP contract.
In restructuring its budget to support the procurement of five (rather than seven)
Virginia-class submarines in FY2004-FY2008, the Navy eliminated advance
procurement (AP) funding in FY2005-FY2007 for long-leadtime nuclear-propulsion
components for second boats procured in FY2007 and FY2008.  The absence of AP
funding in FY2005-FY2007, however, would not prevent a future Congress from
procuring a second boat in either year.  It simply means that the interval between the
year of procurement and the year the boat enters service would be two or three years
longer than usual (i.e., eight or nine years rather than the usual six years).
Congress can, and has, fully funded the procurement of nuclear-powered ships
for which there was no prior-year AP funding for long-leadtime components.  Doing
so involves funding the entire procurement cost of the ship in the year of
procurement, including the funding that normally would have been provided in prior
years as AP funding.  For example, Congress in FY1988 fully funded the
procurement of the aircraft carriers CVN-74 and CVN-75 as a two-ship buy, even
though there had been no prior-year AP funding for the ships.24
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CVN-74 in FY1990, with advanced procurement funding in FY1988 and FY1989, and
CVN-75 in FY1993, with advance procurement funding in FY1989-FY1992.  Following
Congress’s decision in FY1988, construction of long-leadtime components began right
away, construction of CVN-74 itself began about two years later, and construction of CVN-
75 began about two years after that.  CVN-74 entered service in 1995, seven years after the
year of procurement (a typical time to build a carrier), and CVN-75 entered service in 1998,
10 years after the year of procurement.
25 For more on this program, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy CVN-21 Aircraft Carrier
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
Submarine Construction Industrial Base
The Base in General.  In addition to GD/EB and NGNN, the submarine
construction industrial base includes hundreds of supplier firms in numerous states.
Many of these supplier firms are the sole sources of what they make for the U.S.
submarine program.  Observers in recent years have expressed concern for the
continued survival of many of these firms.
The submarine construction industrial base went through a period of significant
stress due to very low levels of work in the 1990s, after procurement of Seawolf
submarines was terminated and before procurement of Virginia-class submarines
began.  The situation appears to have stabilized in recent years under one-per-year
procurement of Virginia-class boats.  For nuclear-propulsion component suppliers,
an additional source of stabilizing work is the Navy’s nuclear-powered aircraft carrier
construction program.25  In terms of work provided to these firms, a carrier nuclear
propulsion plant is roughly equivalent to five submarine propulsion plants.
Current Concern for Design and Engineering Portion.  The part of the
submarine industrial base that some observers are currently most concerned about is
not the construction portion, but the design an engineering portion, much of which
is resident at GD/EB and NGNN.  With Virginia-class design work now winding
down and no other submarine-design projects underway, the submarine design and
engineering base is facing the near-term prospect, for the first time in about 50 years,
of having no major submarine-design project on which to work.
Some Navy and industry officials are concerned that unless a major submarine-
design project is begun soon, the submarine design and engineering base will begin
to atrophy through the departure of experienced personnel.  Rebuilding an atrophied
submarine design and engineering base, these Navy and industry officials believe,
could be time-consuming, adding time and cost to the task of the next submarine-
design effort, whenever it might begin.  Concern about this possibility among some
Navy and industry officials has been strengthened by the UK’s recent difficulties in
designing its new Astute-class SSN.  The UK submarine design and engineering base
atrophied for lack of work, and the subsequent Astute-class design effort has
experienced considerable delays and cost overruns.  Submarine designers and
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26 See, for example, Andrew Chuter, “U.K. Spending Mounts for U.S. Help on Sub,”
Defense News, September 13, 2005: 4; Richard Scott, “Electric Boat Provides Project
Director for Astute Class,” Jane’s Navy International, May 2004: 33; Richard Scott, “Astute
Sets Out on the Long Road to Recovery,” Jane’s Navy International, Dec. 2003, pp. 28-30;
Richard Scott, “Recovery Plan Shapes Up for Astute Submarines,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,
Nov. 19, 2003, p. 26.
27 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition
& Technology,  Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on [the] Submarine of the
Future, July 1998, pp. 7, 19-20.
28 CRS Report RL30045, Navy Attack Submarine Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke. 
29 CRS Report RL31372, Navy Shipbuilding in the FY2003 Defense Budget: Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
30 The steady-state replacement rate is the average procurement rate that would be needed,
over the long run, to maintain a force at a given size over the long run.  It is equal to the
force-level goal divided by expected service life — in this case, 55 boats divided by 33
years, or 1.67 boats per year.
engineers from GD/EB were assigned to the Astute-class project to help the UK
overcome these problems.26
Recent Procurement Rates and Congressional Concern
The post-Cold War downturn in procurement began sooner and was
proportionately deeper for attack submarines than for most other kinds of Navy ships.
 As a result, achieving and maintaining certain potential future attack submarine force
levels in future years could be particularly challenging.
The rate of attack submarine procurement has been a concern in Congress since
the mid-1990s.  It has been discussed by CRS in testimony to Congress in 1995,
1997, 1999, 2000, 2002, and 2004, in a 1997 CRS presentation to a Defense Science
Board task force on the submarine of the future, which issued its report in 1998;27 in
a 1999-2000 CRS report,28 and in a 2002 CRS report.29  This discussion is updated
to take into account DOD’s FY2006-FY2011 FYDP.
The FY2006-FY2011 FYDP, if implemented, would result in the procurement
of 16 SSNs during the 22-year period FY1990-FY2011.  These 16 boats include the
final Los Angeles class boat (in FY1990), the second and third Seawolf class boats
(in FY1991 and FY1996), and the first 13 Virginia class boats (one each in FY1998,
FY1999, and FY2001-FY2011).  A total of 16 boats in 22 years would equate to an
average procurement rate of about 0.73 boats per year for two-thirds of the SSN
fleet’s 33-year replacement cycle.
If, during this 22-year period, SSNs were instead procured at an average rate of
1.67 boats per year, which is the steady-state replacement rate for a force of 55 boats
with 33-year service lives,30 a total of about 37 SSNs would be procured.  The
FY2006-FY2011 FYDP, if implemented, would thus create an SSN procurement
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the period FY1990-FY2011.  This 21-boat backlog in procurement, which is
equivalent to about 38% of the 55-boat force-level objective, will be masked between
now and about 2015 by the large numbers of SSNs procured during the 1980s.  After
about 2015, however, SSNs procured during the 1980s will reach retirement age and
begin to leave service, and the FY1990-FY2011 backlog in SSN procurement relative
to the steady-state procurement rate, if not by then redressed, will begin to become
apparent.
The figure below shows the consequences on the size of the SSN force out to
the year 2050 of various constant SSN procurement rates after FY2009, assuming
two boats are procured in FY2009 (as under the amended FY2005-FY2009 FYDP)
and a 33-year life for existing SSNs.  The graph assumes no early retirements of
SSNs beyond those that have already occurred (i.e., the refueling of all 688s that will
become available for refuelings over the next several years).  The graph excludes the
four SSGNs that are scheduled to be in service between FY2006 and FY2026.  As
shown in the graph, the attack submarine force under various constant future
procurement rates would reach a minimum level in the late 2020s.
Issues for Congress
The current situation regarding attack submarines poses at least four potential
issues for Congress:
! What should the attack submarine force-level goal be?
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! At what rate should Virginia-class submarines be procured in
coming years? 
! Should the current joint-production arrangement for building
Virginia-class submarines be continued or altered?
! Should the Navy design and procure a new kind of attack
submarine?
Each of these issues is addressed below.
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Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal
What should the attack submarine force-level goal be?
Key Factors to Consider.  In considering what the attack submarine force-
level goal should be, key factors to consider include the following:
! day-to-day demands for attack submarines in recent years;
! recent and potential wartime demands for attack submarines;
! submarine-launched unmanned vehicles (UVs);
! attack submarine homeporting and crewing arrangements;
! the SSGN conversion program; and
! contributions by allied and friendly attack submarines.
The discussion of these key factors runs several pages.  Accordingly, below is
a summary of some key points arising out of the discussion.  Following the summary
are the sections discussing each factor.
Summary of Key Points.  Key points regarding factors affecting the attack
submarine force-level goal include the following:
! Some Navy submarine officers in recent years have argued that an
attack submarine force of roughly 55 boats is insufficient to meet
day-to-day demands for attack submarines from U.S. regional
military combatant commanders, at least not without operating
attack submarines at higher-than-desired operational tempos.  Much
of the day-to-day demand for attack submarines appears to be for
performing ISR missions.  A force of 70 or more submarines, Navy
submarine officers and DOD officials have argued or implied, would
be needed to meet all day-to-day demands for attack submarines, at
least not without operating attack submarines at an elevated
operational tempo.
! Recent major U.S. warfighting operations have used relatively small
numbers of attack submarines — about a dozen or less in each case.
Certain potential future major U.S. warfighting scenarios, such as a
conflict on the Korean Peninsula or a conflict with China, may
feature a greater maritime component and consequently require a
larger number of attack submarines.
! Submarine-launched unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), by
permitting each submarine to perform a greater number of
underwater missions at the same time, could, other things held equal,
be used to argue in favor of having fewer attack submarines.  On the
other hand, submarine-launched unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), by
permitting attack submarines to perform overhead and deep-inland
ISR operations now performed by satellites or by aircraft launched
from land bases and surface ships, could, other things held equal, be
used to argue in favor of having more attack submarines. 
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31 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Increasing the Mission Capability of the Attack
Submarine Force, Mar. 2002.
! Homeporting up to eight additional attack submarines at Guam
(beyond the three already homeported there) and operating attack
submarines with dual or multiple crews — both suggested by the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in a March 2002 report31 —
could, other things held equal, reduce the number of attack
submarines needed to perform a given set of submarine missions and
consequently could, other things held equal, be used to argue in
favor of having fewer attack submarines.
! Converting two or four additional Trident SSBNs into SSGNs
(beyond the four already planned for conversion) could, other things
held equal, reduce at the margin the number of attack submarines
needed to perform a given set of submarine missions and
consequently could, other things held equal, be used to argue in
favor of having fewer attack submarines.  The opportunity to convert
two or four additional Trident SSBNs into SSGNs would depend on
a decision to reduce the SSBN force from the currently planned total
of 14 ships to 12 or 10 ships.
! Submarines from allied and friendly countries, particularly the
United Kingdom (UK) and Australia, might occasionally be able to
perform missions that might otherwise be performed by U.S. attack
submarines and thereby reduce requirements for U.S. attack
submarines.  The reduction in requirements for U.S. attack
submarines, however, might be fairly small, and planning U.S.
forces on the assumption that foreign submarines will be available
to perform these missions entails some risk, given inherent
uncertainty over the future policies of foreign governments.
Day-to-Day Demands for Attack Submarines in Recent Years.
In General.  Some Navy submarine officers and DOD officials in recent years
have argued that an attack submarine force of roughly 55 boats is insufficient to meet
day-to-day demands for attack submarines from U.S. regional military combatant
commanders, at least not without operating attack submarines at higher-than-desired
operational tempos. Navy submarine admirals have stated that since the end of the
Cold War, demands for attack submarines from regional U.S. commanders have
increased, not decreased, that some demands for attack submarines are going
unfilled, and that the high operational tempo of the attack submarine force could
reduce time available for training and expend submarine reactor core life more
quickly than planned, potentially shortening attack submarine service lives.
In November 2004, Admiral Frank Bowman, who was Director of the Navy’s
nuclear propulsion program until November 5, 2004, stated that U.S. theater
combatant commanders want the equivalent of 15 attack submarines to be on station
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32 Christopher P. Cavas, “[Interview With] Adm. Frank “Skip” Bowman,” Defense News,
Nov. 29, 2004, p. 30.
33 Source: Navy Office of Legislative Affairs (NOLA) point paper to CRS of March 25,
1999 (record number LA-586-002), and NOLA e-mail to CRS of December 17, 2002, stating
that the figures in the 1999 point paper had not changed significantly.  An NOLA point
paper to CRS dated August 8, 1996, stated that the global stationkeeping multiplier for
attack submarines was 5.8.  An NOLA point paper to CRS dated September 10, 1992, stated
that the number was 5.7.  The 1992 figure was published by CRS in CRS Report 92-803 F,
Naval Forward Deployments and the Size of the Navy, by Ronald O’Rourke.
34 Robert A. Hamilton, “New War Brings New Debate over Size of Submarine Fleet,” New
London (CT) Day, July 5, 2004.  In Aug. 2004, Rear Admiral Paul F. Sullivan, the
commander of the submarine force of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, said that “At any given time,
roughly eight to 10 of the Navy’s submarines are able to resound to emergent fleet
requirements.”  (David Rush, et al., “Submarines Vital To Navy’s Fleet Response Plan,”
Navy Newsstand [http://www.news.navy.mil], Aug. 19, 2004.
35 “Naval Submarine League Symposium, [Text of] Keynote Address By Admiral F. L.
“Skip” Bowman, U.S. Navy, Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion, June 9,  2004,” Submarine
Review, July 2004. 
36 “Naval Submarine League Symposium Remarks by VADM Kirk Donald, 09 June 2004,”
The Submarine Review, July 2004, p. 83.
continuously, but that the current attack submarine force was sufficient to provide
only about 9.32
The reference to the Navy being able to provide about 9 attack submarines refers
to the fraction of the attack submarine force that, on average over the long run, can
be maintained on station in overseas operating areas at any given moment.  The Navy
reported to CRS in 1999 that, on a global basis, an average of 5.8 attack submarines
are needed to keep one attack submarine continuously on station in a distant
operating area.  This attack submarine “stationkeeping multiplier” changed little
between 1992 and 2002, and is broadly consistent with the stationkeeping multipliers
for other kinds of Navy ships.33  Using this multiplier, keeping a total of about 9
attack submarines continuously on station in overseas operating areas would
nominally require a total attack submarine force of about 52 boats, and keeping 15
boats continuously on station would require a total force of 87 boats.
In July 2004, Admiral Bowman stated that the theater commanders wanted the
equivalent of 13.5 attack submarines to be on station continuously in six different
theaters of operation, but that the current 54-boat attack submarine force was
sufficient to provide only about 9.34  In June 2004, he similarly stated that the theater
commanders “asked for a continuous forward presence of more than 13 boats,
whereas today’s force structure can only provide around 9.”35  Also in June 2004,
then-Vice Admiral Kirk Donald, who at the time was the commander of the Navy’s
submarine forces, stated: “With our current force structure, depot maintenance
workload, and an interdeployment readiness cycle tuned to be as efficient as we can
make it, we can provide the Combatant Commanders with about 65% of the
‘presence with a purpose’ they requested.”36  (In November 2004, Donald succeeded
Bowman as Director of the Navy’s nuclear propulsion program and was promoted
to full admiral.)
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37  Andrew Koch, “[Interview with] Adm. Frank Bowman, Director of US Naval Nuclear
Reactors,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Mar. 31, 2004.  The article stated:
[Admiral] Frank Bowman, director of US Naval Nuclear Reactors, the service’s
senior submariner, says he “fully supports those studies” if they lead to a
reduction in what is being asked of the force. “Today the navy is unable to meet
all the combatant commanders’ submarine requirements,” Adm Bowman says,
explaining that “only about 65% of requirements can be met. There is prima facie
evidence in the real world that to execute the missions those commanders have
been assigned, they need these submarines.
“I would not oppose a finding that said some of the submarine tasking today can
be assigned to other [existing] platforms or future platforms because it would
ease the tension between the desires of the combatant commanders and the
[submarine] inventory and therefore the ability of the navy to meet those
requirements,” Adm Bowman says.
One area being considered is whether intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) missions can be performed by other means, such as
distributed sensor networks. Adm Bowman says he would like “to perhaps find
some relief for our submarines so that missions of higher priority that we are not
able to do today because of the ISR [taskings] could be [taken on].” 
Except for “[Admiral],” material above in italics and brackets below appears as in the
original.
38  Robert A. Hamilton, “Lack of Subs Could Slow Pace of Technology, Admiral Warns,”
New London (CT) Day, Sept. 30, 2003.  The article stated:
From almost 100 submarines in the early 1990s, the number has fallen
steadily to just over 50, and their services are more in demand than at any time
in the Cold War, said Vice Adm. John J. Grossenbacher, who retired as
commander of Naval Submarine Forces this month....
Grossenbacher said several studies that have looked at submarine force
requirements have set the minimum size of the fleet at 68 to 72 submarines.
Studies by other groups have set a smaller number, but he called them
“misinformed,” and often don’t allow for sufficient time between deployments....
“The problem we have today is just numbers,” Grossenbacher said. “We
don’t have enough. ... In my opinion, we’re about as thin as we can be and still
maintain a worldwide deployable and world class submarine force.”
(continued...)
In March 2004, Admiral Bowman stated that “Today the navy is unable to meet
all the combatant commanders’ submarine requirements” and that “only about 65%
of requirements can be met.”37  In September 2003, John Grossenbacher, a recently
retired Navy submarine admiral, stated that attack submarines are more in demand
that at any time in the Cold War, that the attack submarine force is “about as thin as
we can be and still maintain a worldwide deployable and world class submarine
force,” and that as the force declines in size, some demands for submarines to
perform covert ISR missions may go unmet.38
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As the size of the force continues to decline — the Navy is building one
submarine a year, which will eventually result in a force of 30 boats —
Grossenbacher said some requests for the covert surveillance services that
submarines provide are going to “drop off the plate.”
“The question becomes, ‘What is it that you don’t want to know?’”
Grossenbacher said. 
39 Hunter Keeter, “DOD Answers Concerns over Virginia-class Multiyear, Details Sub Force
Shortfalls,”  Defense Daily, June 27, 2003.  The article stated:
Glenn Lamartin, director of defense programs with the office of the
undersecretary of defense, in a June 23 letter to [the General Accounting Office],
outlined that “the pre-9/11 demand was 9.9 SSNs and the post 9/11 demand has
been 12.9 SSNs.”
“Combatant commanders have requested 14.4 SSNs for [calendar year
2003] for national and combatant commander intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR), Tomahawk strike, carrier battlegroup support, and Special
Operations Forces equipped SSN missions,” Lamartin wrote.
“Considering the sustainability and training requirements given its current
SSN force structure, the Navy is able to provide 10.0 of the requested 14.4 SSNs
deployed annually.”...
Citing a 1999 study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lamartin said that dropping
below 55 attack submarines in the 2015 time frame and 62 in the 2025 time
frame would leave regional warfighting commanders “with insufficient capability
to respond to urgent crucial demands without gapping other requirements of high
national interest.”
40 Jason Ma, “Grossenbacher: Sub Force Is Operating at Fastest, Sustainable Pace,”  Inside
the Navy, June 23, 2003.  The article stated:
The submarine force is operating at a maximum rate that still maintains a
surge capability, but that is still not enough to meet the needs of operational
commanders, said Vice Adm. John Grossenbacher, commander of naval
(continued...)
In June 2003, a senior DOD official wrote a letter to the General Accounting
Office stating:  “Combatant commanders have requested 14.4 SSNs for [calendar
year 2003] for national and combatant commander intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR), Tomahawk strike, carrier battlegroup support, and Special
Operations Forces equipped SSN missions.” The letter also stated that “Considering
the sustainability and training requirements given its current SSN fore structure, the
Navy is able to provide 10.0 of the requested 14.4 SSNs deployed annually.”39
In June 2003, Admiral Grossenbacher (then still on active duty) stated that the
attack submarine force was operating at its maximum rate but that this was still
insufficient to meet day-to-day demands for attack submarines.  He stated that the
Navy would need about 70 attack submarines to meet the demands being placed on




Instead of the current 54 attack subs, the Navy really needs 70, he said at
the Naval Submarine League’s conference June 11 in Alexandria, VA. But with
54, “operational commanders are not getting all that they need” and the sub
forces are struggling to support tactical development, operational testing and
long-term “self-investments,” he said.
Grossenbacher and Rear Adm. John Padgett, commander of submarine
forces in the Pacific Fleet, closely monitor the fuel expenditure of the subs to
meet wartime demands or surges. To avoid early depletion of the reactor core,
they would reduce operations if necessary, he said. “We’re walking that fine line
right now,” he added.
“I think we’re getting about as much as we can out of the force and running
them at the fastest pace that we can sustain over time, maintain long-term
readiness, as well as something in the bank for surges,” Grossenbacher said.
41 Jason Ma, “Admiral: Subs Must Be Both Surge-Ready and Deployed Forward,” Inside the
Navy, June 16, 2003.  The article stated:
In preparing for increased surge capability, the submarine force must also
remain deployed forward and should avoid becoming a “garrison force,” said
Rear Adm. John Padgett, commander of submarine forces in the Pacific Fleet.
Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Vern Clark’s “Fleet Response Plan” calls
for a more responsive fleet that can surge a large number of ships on short notice,
requiring new maintenance and training cycles to achieve increased readiness
and availability.
Submarines are forward-deployed to support battle space preparations and
to ensure that operators understand the battle space, Padgett said at the Naval
Submarine League’s annual conference last week in Alexandria, VA.
“I am concerned that the surge mentality might become a bastion
mentality,” he said. “I would argue, from my perspective, that we do not need a
garrison force submarine force. We need to remain a forward-deployed force.”
Submarines must maintain forward deployment because they conduct much
of their training with the navies of allied countries in the Western Pacific like
Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Australia, Padgett said. Such training
includes scenarios with diesel submarines, a threat that some Navy officials have
noted is becoming more sophisticated....
Ultimately, force structure dictates the ability to forward deploy subs, and
the Navy needs more subs, he said. Having submarine homeports in Guam and
Japan partly addresses the lack of enough subs, but the operational tempo is
about 15 percent to 20 percent higher than what he would like, affecting training
(continued...)
that attack submarine operational tempo was about 15 percent to 20 percent higher
than preferred, and that this could affect the amount of time available for training.41
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and maintenance, he said. Although the Navy is managing the shortfall in subs,
the tendency is to put operational requirements over exercise requirements,
which could have a “detrimental effect.” The problem is Navy-wide and not
unique to the sub forces, he added.
42 Jason Ma, “Industry, Navy Officials Push to Boost Annual Submarine Buy Rate,” Inside
the Navy, Mar. 3, 2003.  The article stated:
The Los Angeles-class subs may retire sooner than expected, [Admiral
Frank Bowman] said....  Because demand for subs has increased since the war on
terrorism, the submarine fleet has been operating longer and at faster speeds than
usual. If that continues, sub reactor cores will not last for the expected 30 years,
he said.
Attack submarines are nearing a 90 percent operational tempo and are
transiting at 20 knots rather than 16 knots, he said. The ratio of time in port to
time deployed is about 2-to-1 instead of 3-to-1 before the war on terrorism, he
added.
“Something’s got to give; something will give,” Bowman said. “So we’re
trying to make ends meet, but what’s going to give at the end of the day is the
reactor core endurance.”
See also Dale Eisman, “Subs Could Be Exhausted Early if Heavy Usage Continues,”
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, Feb. 26, 2003; David Lerman, “Attack Subs May Be in Too Deep,”
Newport News Daily Press, Feb. 26, 2003.
43  Matthew Dolan, “Subs in High Demand, Force Commander Says,” Norfolk Virginian-
Pilot, Jan. 27, 2003.  The article stated:
Submarines have been pushed so hard in the war on terrorism that the Navy
is having to turn down requests from combat commanders around the world....
The stealthy ability of submarines to engage in surveillance, reconnaissance
and intelligence gathering has been in high demand since the Sept. 11 attacks,
[Admiral Grossenbacher] said....
“The current operational tempo that we’re operating at is manageable, but I’d
like it to be lower. It’s not a crisis.”
In March 2003, Admiral Bowman stated that the high operational tempo for
attack submarines has been using up reactor core life faster than planned and that as
a result, Los Angeles-class submarines may need to be retired earlier than expected.42
And in January 2003, Admiral Grossenbacher stated that demands for submarines to
perform covert ISR missions has been high since the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, and that the attack submarine force was having to turn down some requests
for attack submarines from regional combatant commanders due to insufficient
forces.43
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Articles making similar points have been published since the mid-1990s, and
particularly since 1999, when the attack submarine force declined to less than 60
boats.44
ISR Operations In Particular.  ISR operations appear to form a key part of
the discussion over day-to-day demands for attack submarines.  As mentioned earlier
(see Background section), the internal Navy study that reportedly recommends
reducing the attack submarine force-level goal to as few as 37 boats reportedly
recommends using satellites to perform ISR missions now done by attack
submarines.
Submarine ISR operations are a sensitive issue that is rarely discussed in public
in any detail.  Some general comments about the matter, however, can be made.
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One set of comments concerns the relative merits of SSNs as ISR platforms.
SSNs offer three basic strengths as platforms for performing ISR missions.  One is
that they can perform such missions without their presence being detected by ISR
targets, increasing the chance of getting candid observations of the targets.  Potential
ISR targets can consult reference sources on satellite orbits to understand when
certain satellites are likely to be overhead, or use radar to detect and track aircraft
flying nearby.  Armed with this information, ISR targets can take steps to conceal
objects or to alter or avoid certain activities.  In contrast, U.S. Navy submarines
operating stealthily are very difficult, if not impossible, for ISR targets to detect,
increasing the chance that the targets will behave candidly.
A second advantage of SSNs as ISR platforms is persistence on station.  Low-
orbiting satellites can view a particular area only periodically as they pass overhead,
and perhaps only for a few minutes at a time.  Aircraft might be able to remain
airborne in a viewing position for a matter of hours before needing to return to base.
An SSN, in contrast, can remain on station in a viewing location continuously for
days, weeks, or even months at a time, permitting the SSN to detect and provide
evidence of patterns of behavior that may be discernible only through continuous
observation over an extended period of time.
A third advantage of SSNs as ISR platforms is their viewing position offshore
and just under the surface of the water.  This position permits them to observe certain
ISR targets — particularly ports, coastal areas, surface ships, other submarines, and
underwater mines — at potentially close ranges, permitting the collection of detailed
information on these targets.
SSNs, however, have two basic limitations as platforms for performing ISR
missions.  One concerns overhead observations, which can be helpful or even critical
in understanding the totality of objects or activities being observed in a certain area.
Satellites and aircraft are inherently capable of performing overhead observations,
but SSNs are not.  SSNs observe land targets from the side, but cannot observe the
totality of objects or activities in a certain area.
A second disadvantage of SSNs as ISR platforms concerns imaging inland
areas.  Satellites and aircraft are inherently capable of imaging inland areas, but SSNs
have relatively little ability to do this.  From their position just below the water’s
surface, SSNs in general can collect images of objects that are no further inland than
the first row of buildings or the first row of hills.
A second general comment about submarine ISR operations concerns how the
universe of ISR targets may have changed since the end of the Cold War.  The end
of the Cold War may have reduced demands for ISR missions against what is now
Russia, but may have increased demands for ISR missions against both countries
other than Russia and non-state actors such as terrorist organizations.
A third general comment concerns the relationship of ISR missions to the attack
submarine force-level requirement.  It is plausible that ISR missions by themselves
might generate a requirement for a relatively large attack submarine force,
particularly if those ISR missions require extended or continuous observations of
intelligence targets.  Performing such missions brings the attack submarine
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stationkeeping multiplier into play, and as explained earlier, only nine or 10 missions
requiring continuous attack submarine presences in overseas operating areas would
be needed to generate an attack submarine force level of about 55.
ISR missions, however, are not necessarily the only day-to-day missions that
might require attack submarines to remain on station on an extended or continuous
basis.  Examples of other missions that might require such operations include
protection of forward-deployed Navy surface ships, covert insertion and recovery of
special operations forces, and Tomahawk strike (i.e., the mission of keeping a certain
number of Tomahawks ready in a given region to be fired on short notice if needed
 — a mission that can also be performed, though not with the same level of
covertness, by surface ships).
If submarine supporters are generally correct about the existence and findings
of the internal Navy study on attack submarines (see Background section), then one
potential implication is that the authors of this study believe that submarine ISR
operations represent the “long pole in the tent” in driving the attack submarine force-
level requirement — the only mission requiring a force of 55 or more attack
submarines.
If this view is held by the authors of the internal Navy study, however, it is not
necessarily shared by all others.  For example, Admiral Bowman’s above-cited
comments from March 2004 suggest that even if attack submarine ISR missions are
reduced, attack submarines will still have other, and possibly even higher-priority,
day-to-day missions to perform.45  This perspective suggests that a force of 55 or
more attack submarines might still be needed on a day-to-day basis even if attack
submarine ISR missions are reduced.
Questions for Congress.  Potential questions for Congress regarding day-
to-day demands for attack submarines include the following:
! If combatant commanders wold like to have 13 to 15 attack
submarines continuously on station, but the attack submarine force
is capable of providing only 9, what kinds of missions are not being
performed due to lack of available attack submarines?
! What is the current operational tempo for U.S. attack submarines,
and how does this compare with the preferred operational tempo?
What effect might current operational tempo have on recruiting and
retention of submarine personnel, submarine training, submarine
maintenance, and reactor core life?
! What portion of combatant commander requests for SSNs are driven
by ISR missions vs. other kinds of missions?  Do ISR missions
represent the “longest pole in the tent” in generating day-to-day
demands for attack submarines?  How many SSNs do combatant
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commanders require on a day-to-day basis for non-ISR missions
such as carrier battlegroup support, SOF support, and Tomahawk
strike?
! What fraction of the information collected by U.S. ISR operations of
all types is collected by U.S. attack submarines?  How is the
information collected by submarines similar to, or different than,
information collected through other means?  How important is
submarine-collected intelligence to national-level policymakers?
How important is it to military commanders?  What is the potential
risk to the United States if U.S. attack submarines collect less of this
information? 
! How might submarine-launched UAVs affect submarine ISR
missions?  What new ISR missions could UAV-equipped
submarines perform?
! To what degree can this information be collected through other
means such as satellites, aircraft, or human intelligence?
Recent and Potential Wartime Demands for Attack Submarines.
Attack Submarines in Recent Conflicts.  The table below summarizes the
numbers of U.S. Navy attack submarines reported to have participated in recent
major U.S. military operations.








13 2 US SSNs fired 12 of 288 Tomahawks used.  SSNs also
performed war-related ISR missions.
1999 Kosovo 6 1 UK SSN, 1 Italian SS,* and 1 Dutch SS were also
involved.  Submarines were used for sea control.  Four SSNs
(3 US; 1 UK) fired some portion of 218 Tomahawks used.
2001-
2002
Afghanistan 2 1 UK SSN was also involved.  2 U.S. SSNs fired about 1/3
of 82 Tomahawks used by the U.S. Navy.  The UK SSN
fired additional Tomahawks. Submarines also conducted
war-related ISR, antisubmarine warfare, and anti-surface
warfare operations. 
2003 Iraq 12 2 UK SSNs were also involved.  12 U.S. and UK SSNs fired
about 1/3 of 802 Tomahawks used.
Sources: DOD and Navy reports and press reports; see footnotes for discussions printed below.
Note: * SS = non-nuclear-powered attack submarine.
The following discussions elaborate on the information in the above table.
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1991 Persian Gulf War (Desert Shield).  A total of 13 U.S. attack
submarines were deployed to the Gulf region for the 1991 Gulf War.  Two of the
submarines launched a total of 12 Tomahawks, or about 4% of the 288 Tomahawks
fired in the war.46  A Navy report on the Navy’s participation in the Gulf war stated:
During Desert Shield/Storm attack submarines not only fired TLAMs, but
provided an array of multimission capabilities to battle group commanders.  Prior
to and during hostilities, eight SSNs were involved in surveillance and
reconnaissance operations.  They also provided indications and warning [a form
of intelligence about impending enemy actions] for the battle groups.  After
hostilities began, an additional five submarines bolstered Navy forces already on
station.47
1999 Kosovo Conflict (Operation Allied Force).  U.S. and allied naval forces
participating in this conflict included six U.S. SSNs, one UK SSN, one Italian non-
nuclear-powered attack submarine (SS), and one Dutch SS. The mission of all these
submarines was described as sea control,48  which means maintaining control of the
sea for one’s own use while preventing enemy forces from using it for their own
purposes.  For submarines, this mission typically involves conducting antisubmarine
and anti-surface ship operations.49  A total of 218 Tomahawks were fired in the
conflict by six U.S. surface combatants, three U.S. attack submarines, and one UK
attack submarine.50  The UK submarine fired 21 of the Tomahawks.51
2001-2002 War in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom).  Published
reports indicate that two U.S. attack submarines and at least one UK attack
submarine participated in the war in Afghanistan, that the U.S. submarines launched
about one-third of the 82 Tomahawks fired by U.S. Navy ships, and that the U.S. and
UK submarines together launched 37% of the more than 82 Tomahawks that were
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collectively launched by U.S. and UK ships.52  A Navy submarine admiral stated that,
in addition to firing Tomahawks, the Navy attack submarines during the war in
Afghanistan conducted ISR operations, antisubmarine operations, and anti-surface
ship operations, such as maritime intercept operations.53  Since Afghanistan is a
landlocked country with no navy, the anti-submarine operations were presumably
tracking operations against third-party submarines operating in the region.
2003 Iraq War (Operation Iraqi Freedom).  At the height of the buildup for
the Iraq war, a total of 14 attack submarines — 12 U.S. boats and two UK boats —
were in the Iraq theater of operations.  Ten U.S. boats were in the Red Sea, while two
U.S. and two UK boats were in the Persian Gulf.54  Twelve of the 14 submarines
launched Tomahawks, accounting for about one-third of the 802 Tomahawks fired
in the Iraq war.55
Potential Demands for Attack Submarines in Future Conflicts.
Although the recent major U.S. military operations discussed above used relatively
small numbers of attack submarines, certain potential future conflicts might feature
a greater maritime component and consequently require a larger number of attack
submarines.  Examples of such potential future conflicts include a war on the Korean
Peninsula or a conflict with China.
If China invests significantly in naval modernization for a number of years, it
could eventually field a sizeable and fairly modern fleet.56  Such a fleet would
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represent the first significant naval competitor to the U.S. Navy since the dissolution
of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent collapse of the large and capable
Soviet fleet.  Estimates of when China might possess a large and capable fleet, should
it choose to build one, vary from as early as several years from now to as late as
roughly 2030.57
As mentioned in the background section, the 1999 JCS study on requirements
for attack submarines concluded that a force of 55 SSNs in 2015 and 62 in 2025
“would be sufficient to meet the modeled war fighting requirements.”  One
suggestion of this conclusion is that a force of less than 55 boats might not be
sufficient to meet the modeled warfighting requirements.  If so, this conclusion
contrasts with the reported conclusion of the internal Navy study that a force of as
few as 37 submarines would be sufficient to meet warfighting requirements.
Questions for Congress.  Potential questions for Congress regarding recent
and potential future wartime demands for attack submarines include the following:
! In light of the number of attack submarines that have been used in
recent major U.S. military operations, and the number that might be
used in future major U.S. military operations, how many submarines
might be needed for “swiftly defeating attacks against U.S. allies and
friends in any two theaters of operation in overlapping timeframes,”
and for “decisively defeating an adversary in one of the two theaters
in which U.S. forces are conducting major combat operations by
imposing America’s will and removing any future theat it could
pose,” as called for in current U.S. military strategy?58
! How many additional attack submarines would the Navy need to
have, in addition to those engaged in warfighting operations, for
performing other critical operations around the world during time of
war, and to account for submarines that would be unavailable for
deployed operations at any given time due to maintenance or training
requirements?  When these additional submarines are added in, is
the resulting total number of submarines closer to 55, the number in
the 1999 JCS study, or to as few as 37, the number reported to be in
the more recent internal Navy study?  What factors may have
changed since 1999 that might now permit warfighting requirements
to be met by a force of as few as 37 submarines rather than 55?
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Submarine-Launched Unmanned Vehicles (UVs).  Submarine-launched
UVs promise to”extend their eyes and ears” of submarines and give them the ability
to perform multiple missions at the same time.  Submarine-launched UVs could lead
to arguments in favor of having either larger or smaller numbers of attack
submarines.  On the one hand, UVs, by increasing the capabilities of attack
submarines, could make attack submarines more cost effective as platforms, which
could argue in favor of having more of them in the fleet.   On the other hand, UVs,
by increasing the capabilities of attack submarines (and SSGNs), could permit a
smaller number of attack submarines (in conjunction with SSGNs) to perform a given
set of submarine missions, which could argue in favor of having fewer attack
submarines in the fleet.
Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs).  As mentioned earlier (see
Background section), the internal Navy study that reportedly recommends reducing
the attack submarine force-level goal to as few as 37 boats reportedly recommends
using unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) to perform ISR missions now done by
attack submarines.
Public comments from Navy officials similarly suggest that the Navy may be
focusing on the potential for submarine-launched UUVs to permit a reduction in the
number of attack submarines needed to perform a given set of underwater submarine
missions.  For example, at a hearing before the Projection Forces subcommittee of
the House Armed Services Committee on March 30, 2004, Vice Admiral John
Nathman, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and
Programs — that is, the Navy’s chief officer for determining Navy requirements —
stated the following in answer to a question from Representative Langevin about
submarine procurement and the future size of the attack submarine fleet:
I think everyone should appreciate — and I come back to what the chairman has
asked before about unmanned, underwater vehicles. But there are a lot of
dynamics in how you build force structure requirements for the submarine force.
Right now currently it is built on war-fighting and this compelling need by
the intelligence community for a distributed ISR surveillance capability that our
submarines bring because of their ability to get into those access areas. 
The other debates that I see inside of this is there is a tremendous
requirement for intelligence preparation of the battlespace, again because of the
submarine’s covertness to get into those parts of the battlespace, as they build
that battlespace preparation before a conflict. And at the same time, there is this
dynamic of adding SSGNs to our budget over the last several years, buying four
of those. And then how do you leverage the [payload] volume of SSGN and
trying to understand what your total submarine force structure ought to be? 
And I will make this point about ISR right now. Submarines do that very
well. And they do it for national needs primarily. 
But it seems to make sense to me that if you are going to be asked to take
a very high value, very expensive, very complex device and — like a submarine
 — and keep it in a constrained battlespace so that it can detect certain
communications and signals intelligence in a very confined area, that we might
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be better off in the near term looking at investments in leveraging the volume of
SSGN to putting unmanned, underwater vehicles in those very same places. 
A submarine would probably be the delivery vehicle. But it could be an
SSGN or it could be an SSBN.
So why couldn’t you leverage the force structure that you need by taking
more of this requirement and going offboard into unmanned, underwater vehicles
and that potentially leveraging the investment in SSGNs the same way. 
So this is part of the debate we are having. We are having that debate now
in an underwater sea superiority study with the joint staff and our own significant
study, as you would expect, another study that says let’s look at our total force
structure requirements around the capabilities that we will need in these very
specific fights that we have been looking at, that we see in the future. 
So this is the kind of rigor that we are trying to get to, sir, to understand
what that force structure requirement should be so we don’t under- or overinvest
in the total size of our submarine force.59
Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs).  Equipping attack submarines with
unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) would give attack submarines an ability to conduct
deep-inland and overhead observations, potentially permitting attack submarines to
perform ISR missions now performed by satellites or by aircraft.
Compared to the option of performing these missions with satellites, the option
of performing them with submarine-launched UAVs offers potential advantages in
terms of greater persistence over the ISR target (hours for the UAV vs. perhaps
minutes for the satellite) and less predictability about when the observations are
made.
Compared to the option of performing these missions with manned aircraft or
UAVs launched from land bases or surface ships, the option of performing them with
submarine-launched UAVs offers three potential advantages:
! In-theater land bases.  In-theater land bases for U.S. manned
aircraft or UAVs may not always be available.  When such bases are
available, host nations might place restrictions on how U.S. manned
aircraft or UAVs launched from the bases could be used.  And the
launch of manned aircraft or UAVs from such bases might be
observable to agents working on behalf of the intended ISR target.
Personnel at the ISR target, warned by the agent of the approaching
aircraft, could conceal objects, alter their behavior, or make
preparations for attempting to shoot the aircraft down.  In contrast,
submarines could launch UAVs without need for host-nation base
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access, with no host-nation limits on use, and from locations at sea
where there may be less risk of enemy agents observing the launch,
particularly if the submarine was not known by others to be in the
area.
! Land bases in the United States.  Manned aircraft or UAVs
launched from bases in the United States would likely require many
hours to reach the ISR target area, making them potentially
unsuitable for transitory ISR targets that could disappear during the
aircraft’s flight from the U.S. base.  UAVs launched from land bases
in the Untied States would need to be large enough to fly long
distances to the ISR target area, making them potentially more
expensive and easier to detect and shoot down.  In contrast,
submarines could launch UAVs from in-theater locations, permitting
relatively short flight times to the ISR target area and the use of
smaller UAVs that might be more difficult to detect and shoot down.
! Surface ships.  The offshore presence of a surface ship equipped
with manned aircraft or UAVs could become known to personnel at
the ISR target area, which could prompt them to conceal objects,
alter their behavior, or make preparations for attempting to shoot the
aircraft down.  The offshore presence of an attack submarine,
however, is less likely to become known to personnel at the ISR
target area, making them less likely to take such actions.
The Navy expressed interest in operating UAVs from attack submarines as early
as 1995.60  It conducted its first such experiment in 1996, in which the submarine
assumed control of a Predator UAV that had been launched from a land base.61 The
Navy publicly expressed further interest in the submarine-UAV concept in 2001.62
Directing a UAV from a submarine could require the submarine to remain close
to the surface, so as to keep an antenna exposed to the air, potentially compromising
the submarine’s stealth.  Launching and recovering a UAV from a submarine,
moreover, is technically much more complex than doing so from land bases of
surface ships, particularly when the submarine is submerged, which may be critical
to maintaining the submarine’s stealth.
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Launching a UAV from a submerged submarine would require a UAV that
could rise up through the water after leaving the submarine and then launch itself
from the surface.  The Navy in the past has accomplished something similar with the
submarine-launched versions of the Tomahawk and Harpoon cruise missiles, and
with an older weapon, no longer in service, called the Submarine Rocket (SUBROC).
Bringing a UAV back aboard a submerged submarine would require a UAV that
could land safety on water and then perhaps be recovered by a grappling mechanism
of some kind from the submarine.  The technical challenges of recovering the UAV,
and the cost of a grappling system, could be avoided by designing the UAVs as
expendable assets to be used on one-way missions.  This strategy, however, could
substantially increase costs for procuring UAVs (due to the need to buy replacement
UAVs) and limit the number of UAV ISR missions that a submarine could perform
while operating on its own.
Another option would be to launch the UAV from the submarine but land it at
a land base or on a surface ship.  This would permit the UAV to be reused and avoid
the cost of a grappling system, but still limit the number of UAV ISR missions a
submarine could perform while operating on its own.  In addition, if personnel at the
ISR target learn that a UAV has landed at a land base or on a surface ship, it would
alert them to the possibility that their activities had recently been observed, and
possibly encourage them to take steps to reduce the effectiveness of any follow-on
UAV ISR operations against that site that U.S. commanders might want to conduct.
Questions for Congress.63  Potential questions for Congress regarding
submarine-launched UVs include the following:
! What are the Navy’s current plans for equipping attack submarines
and SSGNs with UUVs?  At what point will submarine-launched
UUVs be sufficiently numerous to potentially permit a smaller
number of submarines to perform a given set of underwater
submarine missions?
! What are the Navy’s plans for developing UAVs that can be
launched from, directed from, and recovered aboard attack
submarines?  In light of the potential operational advantages of
operating UAVs from attack submarines, are these plans adequate?
! What might be the net impact of submarine-launched UUVs and
submarine-launched UAVs on required numbers of attack
submarines?
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64 The first attack submarine to be homeported at Guam arrived in 2002, the second in 2003,
and the third in early 2004.  See, for example, Doug Huddy, “USS Houston to Make Guam
Its Homeport in 2004,” Pacific Stars and Stripes, Mar. 17, 2003.
65 In a “memorandum for interested members of Congress” on the homeporting of attack
submarines in Guam dated Jan. 22, 2001, the Navy stated: “Three attack submarines
homeported in Guam will provide a total of 300 days (on average) of operations and
engagement per year.  Those submarines would provide 130 days of operations and
engagement per year if they were homeported in [the] Third Fleet [i.e., Eastern Atlantic] and
deployed to [the] Seventh Fleet [i.e., Western Pacific] in accordance with current
guidelines.”  300 divided by 130 is about 2.3.  The text of the memo was reprinted in the
Feb. 12, 2001 issue of Inside the Navy under the headline, “Text: Navy Memo on Subs in
Guam.”  For the accompanying news story, see Christian Bohmfalk, “Basing Attack Subs
on Guam Expected To Increase Fleet’s Presence,” Inside the Navy, Feb. 12, 2001.
66 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Increasing the Mission Capability of the Attack
Submarine Force, Mar. 2002, p. 11.
67 Increasing the Mission Capability of the Attack Submarine Force, op. cit., pp. xvii, 30-32.
Submarine Homeporting and Crewing Arrangements.
Guam Homeporting.  The Navy in early 2004 completed an initiative
announced in 2001 to transfer three Pacific Fleet attack submarines to the U.S. island
territory of Guam in the Western Pacific.64  Guam is thousands of miles closer to
potential attack submarine operating areas in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean
than are the Navy’s other Pacific Fleet attack submarine home ports at Pearl Harbor
and San Diego.  In addition, attack submarines homeported in Guam use a different
operating cycle than attack submarines homeported at Pearl Harbor or San Diego.
As a result of both these factors, Guam-homeported attack submarines can
generate significantly more days on station in Pacific Fleet attack submarine
operating areas than can attack submarines homeported in the other two locations.
Navy officials have stated that in terms of operating days, a Guam-homeported attack
submarine is the equivalent of an average of about 2.3 attack submarines homeported
in the Third Fleet (i.e., in San Diego or Pearl Harbor).65  CBO, in a March 2002
report on the attack submarine force, stated that the ratio might be higher, with a
Guam-homeported attack submarine equivalent in operating days to about three
attack submarines homeported elsewhere.66
In general, homeporting additional attack submarines at Guam could reduce the
total number of attack submarines needed to fulfill day-to-day Pacific Fleet attack
submarine missions.  In its March 2002 report, CBO presented an option for
homeporting up to eight additional attack submarines at Guam, for a total of 11.67
CBO estimated the construction cost of the additional facilities needed to implement
this option at about $200 million, which is less than 10% of the procurement cost of
a Virginia-class submarine.  CBO noted that homeporting additional attack
submarines posed some potential disadvantages, including reduced opportunities for
training with Navy ships based in Hawaii or on the U.S. West Coast.  Even so, CBO
concluded that homeporting additional attack submarines at Guam was the most cost
effective of the various options it explored for increasing the mission capabilities of
CRS-33
68 Increasing the Mission Capability of the Attack Submarine Force, op. cit., pp. ix, 32.  
69 Increasing the Mission Capability of the Attack Submarine Force, op cit, p. xv-xvi, 20-30.
For articles expressing Navy concerns with dual- or multiple crewing of attack submarines,
see Paul F. Sullivan, “Letter to the Editor,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Dec. 2002, pp.
14, 16; and Christian Bohmfalk, “Fages Says Navy Wary Of Double-Crewing Subs To
Increase Presence,” Inside the Navy, May 8, 2000.  Sullivan’s letter to the editor was in
response to an article in the magazine based on the March 2002 CBO report.  (See Eric J.
Labs, “Countering Attack Sub Shortfalls,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Sept. 2002, pp.
46-48, 50.)  
70 See Christian Bohmfalk, “Submarine Chiefs Willing to Explore Double Crewing for
SSNs,” Inside the Navy, July 3, 2000; and P. J. Skibitski, “Pacific Submariners Consider
Basing Nuclear Attack Boats in Guam,” Inside the Pentagon, July 13, 2000, p. 1.  The
second article about a Pacific Fleet study on forward-homeporting submarines at Guam
stated:
If one sub were based [in Guam], the service could “dual-crew” the boat by
shuttling sailors from Hawaii, [Rear Admiral Albert] Konetzni said.  One crew
could take a sub on a deployment, and when it got back, another crew could take
the boat out....
If two or three of the early [Los Angeles-class submarines] were
homeported in Guam, sailors and their families could live there and only single-
crewing would be necessary.  Numerous other arrangements, such as three crews
for two ships, are also being looked at in the study, Konetzni said.”
the attack submarine fleet.68  As mentioned earlier (see Background section), the
internal Navy study that reportedly recommends reducing the attack submarine force-
level goal to as few as 37 boats reportedly recommends homeporting a total of 9
attack submarines at Guam.
Crewing Arrangements.  The March 2002 CBO report also presented an
option for increasing submarine operating days through the use of dual crewing (two
crews for each submarine) or multiple crewing (three crews for two submarines).
The Navy has long used dual crewing for its SSBNs and plans to do so with its
SSGNs.  CBO estimated that dual-crewing could produce an 80% increase in an
attack submarine’s operating days, while multiple crewing could result in a 100%
increase.
CBO noted in its report that implementing this option would require additional
spending to support the additional crews, and that the Navy raised several concerns
about the option, including the time needed to recruit and train the additional crews,
the challenge of keeping the crews trained between deployments without access to
their boats, and increased wear and tear on attack submarines (which, unlike SSBNs,
are not engineered to be used intensively at sea by more than one crew).69  On at least
two occasions in 2000, however, Navy officials expressed some interest in the idea.70
Questions for Congress.  Potential questions for Congress regarding
submarine homeporting and crewing arrangements include the following:
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! What does the experience to date with the homeporting of three
attack submarines at Guam suggest about the potential for
homeporting additional attack submarines there?  What is the
maximum number of additional attack submarines that could be
homeported at Guam?  What would be the potential construction
cost for new facilities needed to homeport additional attack
submarines at Guam?  How long would it take to build those
facilities and otherwise implement a decision to homeport additional
attack submarines at Guam?
! In light of recent Navy experiments with new approaches for
crewing and deploying surface ships, including the Sea Swap
concept for sending ships on long (e.g., 18- or 24-month)
deployments and rotating multiple crews out to the ships,71 should
the Navy reexamine options for crewing and deploying attack
submarines?
SSGN Conversion Program.  SSGNs can perform some missions that might
otherwise be performed by attack submarines, particularly Tomahawk strike, support
of special operations forces, and, in the future, missions enabled by UVs.  Compared
to an attack submarine, an SSGN can carry much larger numbers of Tomahawks,
SOF personnel, and UVs.  SSGNs can also deploy larger-sized UVs than can be
deployed by today’s attack submarines.  The cost-effectiveness of the SSGNs in
performing these missions is increased by the Navy’s plan to operate these boats with
dual crews so as to increase the percentage of time that each SSGN is at sea in an
operating area.
In light of the SSGNs’ capabilities, the Navy’s planned force of four SSGNs
may reduce the number of attack submarines needed to perform submarine missions.
By the same token, increasing the number of SSGNs in the fleet beyond the four now
planned could, other things held equal, further reduce the number of attack
submarines needed to perform a given set of submarine missions.
The Navy procured a total of 18 SSBNs between FY1974 and FY1991.  The
ships entered service between 1981 and 1997.  The Clinton Administration’s 1994
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) recommended a strategic nuclear force for the
START II strategic nuclear arms reduction treaty that included 14 Tridents rather
than 18.  The Bush Administration’s 2002 NPR retained the idea of reducing the
Trident SSBN force to 14 boats.  The reduction in the planned Trident SSBN force
from 18 boats to 14 made the first four Tridents available for conversion into SSGNs.
Any future decision to reduce the SSBN force further — to 12 or 10 boats, for
example — could make two or four additional Tridents available for conversion to
SSGNs.
Allied and Friendly Attack Submarines.  As mentioned earlier in the
section reviewing recent wartime demands for attack submarines, allied submarines
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72 The United States and the UK have a history of close cooperation on sensitive security
issues that dates back to World War II and the wartime effort to develop a nuclear weapon.
Following the war, the United States assisted the UK’s effort to develop nuclear-powered
submarines, which was experiencing technical difficulties, by providing the UK with a
complete U.S. submarine reactor plant for installation in the UK’s first SSN.  The United
States closely guards its submarine and naval nuclear propulsion technology and has shared
the latter only with the UK.  The United States has sold the UK Tomahawk cruise missiles
and Trident SLBMs for use on UK SSNs and SSBNs, respectively.  U.S. facilities are used
to provide life-cycle maintenance support for the UK SLBMs.
73 In 1998-2000, it was reported that Australia’s new submarines, which were designed in
Sweden and built in Australia by the Australian Submarine Corporation (ASC), were
experiencing acoustic problems (i.e., excessive noise), problems with their combat systems,
and other difficulties, and that the U.S. Navy was helping to fix the acoustic and combat-
system problems.  (“Australia Say Serious Problems with New Submarines,”  Reuters wire
service, Oct. 10, 1998; Antony Preston, “‘Serious Problems’ Reported With New Australian
SSKs,” Sea Power, Dec. 1998, pp. 31-32; Gregor Ferguson, “Report Slams Australia’s
Project Management,” Defense News, July 19, 1999; Norman Friedman, “Sub Problems
Down Under Continue,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Sept. 1999, pp. 121-123; “Report
Targets Collins Class,”  Jane’s Navy International, Sept. 1999, p. 4; David Lague, “U.S.
Experts In Salvage Efforts For Stricken Subs,” Sydney Morning Herald, Mar. 20, 2000;
Norman Friedman, “Fixing the Collins Class,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 2000,
pp. 98-100, 102;  David Lague, “Sweden Goes to War: Australia Blasted over Submarine
Secrets,” Sydney Morning Herald, Dec. 29, 2000, p. 1.)
In 2000, it was reported that the U.S. Navy granted GD/EB permission to explore how it
might help Australia fix problems with its submarines, and that GD/EB sent a team of
experts to Australia.  (Gregor Ferguson and Robert Holzer, “U.S. Releases Sub Info to
Australian Navy,” Defense News, Mar. 6, 2000, pp. 1, 26; Robert A. Hamilton, “EB Looking
for Business Down Under,” New London (CT) Day, Mar. 1, 2000.)
In 2001, it was reported that the U.S. Navy and the Australian Navy signed a statement of
principles for sharing classified technology and otherwise promoting interoperability
between the U.S. and Australian submarine fleets.  (Robert Garran, “US Threat to Sink
Strategic Alliance,” The Australian, Dec. 23, 2000;  Craig Skehan, “Huge Payout After US
Applies Pressure Over Defence Tenders,” Sydney Morning Herald, July 10, 2001; Robert
Garran, “Navy Ties Up to Uncle Sam,” The Australian, July 11, 2001; Jason Sherman,
"Australian, U.S. Navies to Share Classified Work,” Defense News, Aug. 27-Sept. 2, 2001,
p. 6; Ian Bostock, “About Face on RAN’s Collins Combat System,” Jane’s Navy
International, Sept. 2001, p. 6; Gregor Ferguson, “Australian, U.S. Navies to Sign
Agreement Sept. 10,” Defense News, Sept. 10-16, 2001; Ian Bostock, “ RAN-USN Pact on
Submarine Strategy,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Oct. 10, 2001, p. 29.)
In 2002-2003, it was reported that GD/EB had become a “capability partner” to ASC and
would provide technical support for Australia’s submarines.  ("Australia to Buy Raytheon
Submarine Combat System," Defense Daily, Sept. 16, 2002; "Australia Commissions Final
Collins-Class Submarine,"  Defense Daily, Apr. 1, 2003.)
on occasion have participated in U.S.-led military operations.  In theory, allied
submarines might also be able to perform day-to-day missions that might otherwise
be performed by U.S. attack submarines.  In light of the close security relationship
that the United States maintains with the UK,72 and the apparent growing security
relationship that the United States is developing with Australia,73 submarines from
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these two countries might be of particular interest as candidates for performing
missions that might otherwise be performed by U.S. attack submarines.
The UK currently operates a force of 11 SSNs, while Australia operates a force
of six large diesel-electric submarines.  UK submarines might be able to assist the
United States in performing attack submarine missions in locations such as the
Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea, the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Indian
Ocean/Persian Gulf region.  Australian submarines might be able to assist the United
States in performing attack submarine missions in locations such as parts of the
Indian Ocean and the waters around the Indonesian archipelago.
Given the relatively small sizes of the UK and Australian submarine forces, each
country might have only one or two submarines in deployed status at any given time.
Deployed UK and Australian submarines, moreover, might spend much of their
deployed time performing missions of specific interest to their own governments,
rather than missions that may also be of interest to the United States.  And Australia’s
diesel-electric submarines may not be well suited for performing certain missions of
interest to the United States, particularly day-to-day ISR missions that might require
long, stealthy transits to the operating area, extended periods of submerged
operations in the operating area, and long, stealthy transits back to home port.  Non-
nuclear-powered submarines are less well suited than SSNs for performing such
missions.  As a result, the number of occasions when UK or Australian submarines
might be able to perform missions of interest to the United States might be fairly
small.
The submarine forces of U.S. allies and friendly countries other than the UK and
Australia are also rather small.  In addition, with the exception of France, some of
whose attack submarines are nuclear-powered, the submarine forces of these other
countries consist entirely of non-nuclear-powered boats, which may limit their ability
to perform certain missions of interest to the United States.  The reduction in
requirements for U.S. attack submarines that might be possible through use of
submarines from U.S. allies and friendly countries other than the UK and Australia
consequently would also likely be limited.
On the other hand, as suggested by the earlier discussion of the stationkeeping
multiplier for U.S. Navy attack submarines, even the occasional performance of a
submarine mission of interest to the United States by a submarine from the UK,
Australia, or another allied country could have a somewhat leveraged effect in
relieving strain on the U.S. attack submarine force, particularly for performing short-
duration missions that are relatively close to the allied country in question but far
from the home ports of U.S. attack submarines.
It can also be noted, however, that as a general matter, planning U.S. military
forces on the assumption that forces from other countries, even close allies, will be
available to perform certain missions of interest to the United States entails some
risk, given inherent uncertainty over the future policies of foreign governments.  The
UK or Australia, for example, might decide at some point to reduce the size of its
submarine force for affordability reasons, reducing the contribution that the force
CRS-37
74 In May 2004, for example, it was reported that UK government was considering reducing
the size of its navy, including its submarine force.  (Michael Evans, “Admiral Expects
Ruthless Cuts in Navy Strength,” London Times, May 12, 2004.)
75 “British Plan Smaller Fleet for Future Contingencies,” Defense Daily, July 27, 2004;
Richard Scott, “Navy See Cuts Across Fleet,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 28, 2004, pp. 14;
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Navy International,” Sept. 2004, p. 5.
76 As mentioned in the background section, the steady-state replacement rate equals the
desired force level divided by the expected service life of the platforms in question.
could make to performing missions of interest to the United States.74  Indeed, the UK
in July 2004 announced that, as part of a plan to reduce the size of its Navy, it would
reduce its SSN force to eight boats by December 2008.75
Future Virginia-Class Procurement Rate
At what rate should Virginia-class submarines be procured in coming years?
Key Factors to Consider.  In considering the rate at which Virginia-class
submarines should be procured in coming years, key factors to consider include the
following:
! the attack submarine force-level goal;
! attack submarine service lives;
! the effect of annual procurement rates on unit procurement costs;
! industrial-base considerations; and
! funding requirements for other defense-spending priorities.
Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal.  The attack submarine force-level
goal, once determined, is a primary factor to consider in assessing at what rate
Virginia-class boats should be procured in coming years.
Long-Term Steady-State Replacement Rate.  One potential starting point
in relating a force-level goal to required procurement rates is to calculate the steady-
state replacement rate, which is the average procurement rate that would be needed
over the long run to maintain a force of a given size over the long run.76  The table
below shows steady-state replacement rates for submarine forces varying in size from
30 to 80 (i.e., a range that varies 25 boats downward and upward from the current
force-level goal of 55 boats).  The table assumes a 33-year service life for attack
submarines.
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Table 4. Steady-State Replacement Rates












Steady-state replacement rates are averages that must me met over the long term
(in this case, over a 33-year period).  Over shorter periods, the actual procurement
rate can be either above or below the steady-state rate, depending on factors such as
the age distribution of the existing force, available funding, and industrial-base
considerations.  If the actual procurement rate is below the steady-state rate for some
number of years, though, it must eventually be elevated above the steady-state rate,
so that the average rate, calculated over the entire period in question, comes back to
the steady-state rate. 
Notional Procurement Profiles for Forces of 30 to 80 Boats.  Table
5 presents notional attack submarine procurement profiles for the 25-year period
FY2005-FY202929 for supporting attack submarine forces of 30, 40, 50, 55, 60, 70,
and 80 boats (excluding any SSGNs), reflecting the age distribution of the existing
attack submarine force.  The existing attack submarine force is not evenly distributed
in age because it includes a large number of SSNs procured in the 1980s and a small
number procured in the 1990s.
For each of the seven force sizes considered, two notional procurement profiles
(A and B) are presented.  Profile A in each instance minimizes the procurement rate
during the FYDP, while profile B uses higher rates of procurement during the FYDP.
The profiles employ generally stable rates of procurement, if possible, between about
FY2010 and FY2023.
All 14 notional profiles procure at least one boat per year during the period
FY2004-FY2008, as called for in the FY2004-FY2008 MYP arrangement approved
for the Virginia-class program.  For forces of 55 or more boats, profile B procures
two boats per year in FY2007-FY2008.  None of the 14 notional profiles employ a
maximum procurement rate of more than four boats per year — the maximum annual
rate that was achieved for attack submarines during the Cold War years of the 1980s,
when the Navy was working toward achieving and maintaining a force of 100 SSNs.
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Table 5. Notional Procurement Profiles for Various Force Sizes
(shading included for clarity)
FY
Size of force supported (two options — A and B — for each force size)
30 40 50 55 60 70 80
A B A B A B A B A B A B A B
2005 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2006 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2007 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
2008 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
2009 0 1 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 3
2010 0 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 3 4
2011 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4
2012 1 1 2 1 3 2 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4
2013 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 3 4 4 4 4
2014 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 3 4 4 4 4
2015 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 4 4 4 4
2016 1 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 2 4 4 4 4
2017 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 4 4 4 4
2018 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4
2019 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4
2020 2 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4
2021 2 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 4
2022 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 4
2023 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 2 4 4
2024 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 4 4
2025 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 4
2026 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0
2027 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2028 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2029 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
The following points arise from the figures in the table and the data underlying
the figures:
! For a 30-boat force.  Supporting a force of about 30 boats could
involve maintaining an average procurement rate of about one boat
per year into the 2020s.  If industrial-base considerations do not
preclude a hiatus in Virginia-class procurement, a force of about 30
boats could be maintained without procuring any Virginia-class
boats in FY2009-FY2010, provided that two boats per year were
procured for a few years at some point after the hiatus (profile 30A).
If all SSNs are operated to the end of their expected 33-year lives,
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then the force would decline to 30 boats by about 2028 and remain
about there after that.  The force could be reduced to 30 boats much
sooner by accelerating the retirement of older SSNs.
! For a 40-boat force.  Supporting a force of about 40 boats could
involve maintaining an average procurement rate of about two boats
per year from about FY2012 or FY2013 to about FY2024.  If
industrial-base considerations do not preclude a single-year hiatus in
Virginia-class procurement (as shown earlier in Table 1, the
Virginia-class program experienced single-year hiatus in FY2000),
a force of about 40 boats could be maintained without procuring any
Virginia-class boats in FY2009 (profile 40A).  If all SSNs are
operated to the end of their expected 33-year lives, then the force
would decline to 40 boats by about 2027 and remain about there
after that.  The force could be reduced to 40 boats much sooner by
accelerating the retirement of older SSNs.
! For a 50-boat force.  Supporting a force of about 50 boats could
involve maintaining an average procurement rate of about 2.5 boats
per year during the period FY2009-FY2023.  If all SSNs are
operated to the end of their expected 33-year lives, then the force
would decline to 50 boats by about 2018 and remain about there
after that.  The force could be reduced to 50 boats much sooner by
accelerating the retirement of older SSNs.
! For a 55-boat force.  Supporting a force of about 55 boats could
involve maintaining an average procurement rate of about 2.7 to 2.9
boats per year during the period FY2009-FY2023.  The force would
grow to 60 or 61 boats by FY2013 before returning to 55 boats by
2016 or 2017.  The force could be held to about 55 boats prior to
2016 of 2017 by accelerating the retirement of older SSNs.
! For a 60-boat force.  Achieving and maintaining a force of about 60
boats could involve maintaining an average procurement rate of
about 3.0 to 3.1 boats per year during the period FY2009-FY2023.
Within that period, the procurement rate may need to climb to four
boats per year for a few years.  The force would reach 60 boats
around 2013.  Under profile 60A, the force would reach 60 boats
around 2013, then decline to the mid-50s for a few years and return
to 60 by about 2021.  Under profile 60B, the force would reach 60
boats around 2013 and remain there after that.
! For a 70-boat force.  Achieving and maintaining a force of about 70
boats could involve maintaining an average procurement rate of
about 3.7 or 3.8 boats per year during the period FY2009-FY2023.
The force would reach 70 boats around 2029 (profile 70A) or 2025
(profile 70B) and remain there after that.
! For an 80-boat force.  Achieving and maintaining a force of about
80 boats could involve maintaining an average procurement rate of
CRS-41
77 For a discussion of improved economies of scale in Navy shipbuilding due to increased
spreading of fixed overhead costs and reduced loss of learning between ships, see CRS
(continued...)
about 3.7 or 3.8 boats per year during the period FY2009-FY2026.
The force would reach 80 boats around 2032 (profile 80A) or 2031
(profile 80B) and remain there after that.
Attack Submarine Service Lives.  As mentioned earlier, SSNs have
expected service lives of 33 years.  The notional procurement profiles outlined above
reflect this figure.  As also mentioned earlier, however, the current high operational
tempo for the attack submarine force could reduce the service lives of SSNs to
something less than 33 years by accelerating the rate at which reactor core life is used
up.  If the service lives of existing SSNs turn out to be less than 33 years due to either
higher-than-planned rates of reactor core use or general wear and tear on the ships,
then the procurement rates needed to maintain attack submarine forces of various
sizes may need to be greater than shown in the notional profiles outlined above.
Conversely, if the service lives of SSNs can be increased to something greater
than 33 years, then procurement rates needed to maintain attack submarine forces of
various sizes could possibly be lower than shown in the notional profiles outlined
above.  If, for example, the service lives of Navy SSNs can be extended to 40 years,
then an annual procurement rate of 1 or 1.5 boats per year would, over the long run,
be sufficient to maintain a force of 40 to 60 boats, rather than 33 boats.
The feasibility and potential cost of extending the service lives of the Navy’s
SSNs is not clear.  The Navy a few years ago increased the expected service lives of
its SSBNs (including the four being converted into SSGNs) from 30 years to 42
years, with the new 42-year life to consist of two 20-year operating periods with a
two-year refueling in between.  The typical mission profile of an SSBN, however,
may be less stressful on the boat than is the typical mission profile of an SSN.
Compared to SSBN operations, SSN operations can involve submerging and
surfacing more frequently (placing more frequent cyclic stress on the submarine’s
pressure hull) and more frequent high-speed runs (which can lead to higher rates of
wear and tear on propulsion machinery).
Unlike earlier Navy SSNs, which were built with reactor cores intended to last
about 15 years, Seawolf- and Virginia-class boats have cores that are intended to last
the 33-year expected life of the ship.  Extending the lives of Seawolf- or Virginia-
class boats 40 years, if feasible, would thus involve changing their life-cycle
maintenance plans to include a refueling at about age 33 or earlier.
Annual Procurement Rates and Unit Procurement Costs.    A third
factor to consider in determining the rate at which Virginia-class submarines should
be procured in future years is the effect of annual procurement rates on unit
procurement costs.  Due to increased spreading of fixed overhead costs at the
shipyards and supplier firms, and reduced loss of learning between ships at the
shipyards and possibly also at supplier firms, procuring attack submarines at higher
annual rates can reduce their unit procurement cost by several percent.77  Cost figures
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Report 96-785 F, Navy Major Shipbuilding Programs and Shipbuilders: Issues and Options
for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke. 
78 In the FY2005 budget submission, the two Virginia-class boats programmed for FY2009
have an estimated total procurement cost of $4,940.1 million, or an average of $2,470.0
million per boat, while the one Virginia-class boat programmed for FY2008 has an
estimated total procurement cost of $2,593.5 million.  The difference in unit procurement
costs between the two years is $123.5 million.  The FY2008 boat, moreover, is being
procured under a MYP arrangement that is reducing its cost by roughly $80 million, while
the estimated procurement cost for the two FY2009 boats may not reflect an assumed
follow-on MYP.  If so, then increasing the cost of the FY2008 boat to set aside differences
due to use or non-use of MYP, and thereby arrive at a more apples-to-apples comparison,
would increase the cost of that boat (and consequently the difference in unit procurement
costs between that boat and the FY2009 boats) by about $80 million, for a total difference
of more than $200 million.  (This figure might be increased by another 2%, reflecting an
average 2% difference in purchasing power between the then-year dollars used to build a
boat procured in FY2008 vs. the then-year dollars used to build boats procured in FY2009.)
The cost difference might then be adjusted downward to reflect the later position on the
production learning curve of the FY2009 boats compared to the FY2008 boat.
In the FY2004 budget submission, on the other hand, the two Virginia-class boats
programmed for FY2007 had an estimated procurement cost of $4,424.0 million, or an
average of $2,212.0 million per boat, while the one Virginia-class boat programmed for
FY2006 had an estimated total procurement cost of $2,220.8 million.  In this case, moving
from one boat per year to two boats per year did not appear to produce a significant apparent
reduction in unit procurement cost.
The FY2004 and FY2005 budget submissions can also be compared against one another to
examine differences in estimated unit costs for procuring one boat per year in FY2007 and
FY2008 (as in the FY2005 submission) vs. two boats per year in FY2007 and FY2008 (as
in the FY2004 submissions).  This comparison is more difficult to make because the two
submissions appear to reflect different understandings of what Virginia-class boats would
cost to procure at any annual rate (with estimated costs in the FY2005 submission generally
higher).  Attempting to adjust for the different understandings, however, suggests that
increasing the procurement rate from one ship per year to two ships per year might reduce
unit procurement cost by more than $100 million, and possibly more than $200 million.
79 Under the current joint-production arrangement for the Virginia class, the two yards each
maintain facilities for building submarine reactor compartments and for carrying out final
assembly and testing of submarines.
in the FY2004 and FY2005 budget submission, for example, suggest that increasing
the procurement rate from one boat per year to two per year can reduce unit
procurement cost by more than $100 million, and possibly more than $200 million.78
Industrial-Base Considerations.  A fourth factor to consider in
determining the rate at which Virginia-class submarines should be procured in future
years is the submarine construction industrial base, which currently includes
something more than one complete submarine production line divided between two
shipyards (GD/EB and NGNN),79 plus an array of material and component suppliers,
many of which are sole sources.  Industrial-base considerations include the following:
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conversion program includes manufacturing of components for the SSGN conversions.  The
SSGN conversions are being carried out at government-operated naval shipyards at Norfolk,
VA, and Bremerton, WA.
81 Source: CRS Report 96-785 F, Navy Major Shipbuilding Programs and Shipbuilders:
Issues and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.  The figures were based on
interviews with officials from the two shipyards.  The figure for GD/EB pertained to its
Land Level Construction Facility (LLCF); additional submarines could be built at GD/EB’s
(continued...)
! the minimum annual production rate for maintaining the submarine
construction industrial base;
! the maximum annual production rate that could be achieved by the
submarine construction industrial base; and
! potential inefficiencies resulting from certain kinds of year-to-year
changes in the annual submarine procurement rate.
Minimum Production Rate.  The current one-per-year Virginia-class
procurement rate appears to have been sufficient, in conjunction with other
supporting forms of work (including aircraft carrier procurement and SSGN
conversions),80 to maintain the submarine construction industrial base in recent years.
The submarine construction industrial base also appears to have managed the one-
year hiatus in Virginia-class procurement in FY2000, suggesting the industrial base
might be able to manage occasional one-year gaps in the future.  In contrast, the
submarine construction industrial base appears to have had greater difficulty
managing the longer gaps in submarine procurement that occurred in the 1990s.
This experience suggests that the minimum annual procurement rate for
sustaining the submarine construction industrial base in its current form might be one
boat per year, or perhaps something a bit less than one per year (as a result of
occasional single-year gaps in procurement), provided that other supporting forms
of work, including aircraft carrier construction, are also funded.
A procurement rate of significantly less than one per year, in contrast, might not
be sufficient to maintain the submarine construction industrial base in its current
form.  Under this scenario, critical supplier firms might be at risk of going out of
business, and shipyard workers with skills critical to submarine construction might
need to be laid off.  Navy and industry officials have cautioned on many occasions
since the 1990s that reconstituting parts of the submarine construction industrial base
following a period of very-low-rate procurement could require substantial time and
cost due to the need to create and certify replacement supplier firms and hire and
train new submarine construction workers.
Maximum Annual Production Rate.  In the mid-1990s, GD/EB officials
stated that their shipyard could build a maximum of three attack submarines per year,
while officials at Newport News Shipbuilding (now NGNN) stated that their shipyard
could build a maximum of four attack submarines per year, making for a combined
maximum production capability of seven attack submarines per year.81
CRS-44
81 (...continued)
older inclined building ways.  The figure for Newport News Shipbuilding pertained to its
Modular Outfitting Facility (MOF); additional submarines could be built at the yard’s
graving docks.  As noted in the 1996 CRS report, achieving and maintaining these maximum
rates could require the yards to curtail or eliminate other forms of work, or result in levels
of employment at the yards that could strain the managerial and supervisory capabilities of
the yards.  The figures also did not take into account possible capacity limitations in critical
supplier firms that could prevent these rates from being achieved.
82 Source: CRS telephone conversations with General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman
officials, May 4, 2004.
83 Source: Information provided to CRS by Naval Nuclear Propulsion Office (NAVSEA-
08H), May 5, 2004.
In the years since then, the two shipyards have streamlined their operations to
bring them more into alignment with the current one-per-year submarine procurement
rate.  In doing so, however, the two yards do not appear to have taken any steps (such
as selling critical parcels of land that would be needed for additional production
facilities) that would prevent them from returning to higher rates of production.
Officials at both yards state that they could return to a combined rate of four or more
submarines per year.82
The supplier base for submarine construction was reduced during the 1990s to
bring it into alignment with the current one-per-year submarine procurement rate.
Building the supplier base back up to support a procurement rate of three or four
boats per year is possible.  It would, however, require time and money, particularly
for nuclear propulsion plant component suppliers.  Increasing the production capacity
of the nuclear component supplier base to support a procurement rate of three or four
submarines per year starting FY2011 would require roughly $100 million (for a rate
of three submarines per year) or $200 million (for a rate of four submarines per year).
This additional funding would be required over the next several years, with the first
increment required in FY2005.  If the procurement rate is increased to three or four
per year prior to FY2011 (as it would be under notional profiles 55A, 60A or B, 70A
or B, and 80A or B from table 5), some of the submarines procured in those years
would take a year or more longer to build than usual due to nuclear component
supplier bottlenecks.83
Inefficiencies from Certain Year-to-Year Rate Changes.  Moving
abruptly from a lower annual production rate to a higher rate (i.e., moving from one
boat in a given year to three or four boats the following years) can lead to transitional
strains at the shipyards and suppliers as they attempt to increase their production
facilities and hire and train large numbers of new workers.  Such strains can lead to
production inefficiencies and higher costs.  The notional procurement profiles in
Table 5 avoid such abrupt jumps by increasing the procurement rate from one year
to the next by no more than one boat per year.
Procurement profiles that, within a period of a few years, reduce the
procurement rate significantly and then increase it again (even by no more than one
boat per year) can lead to production inefficiencies and higher costs due to the need
to either keep skilled workers on the payroll during the period of decline, or to hire
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and train new workers during the subsequent period of increase.  Notional examples
of such “roller coaster” procurement profiles might be 2-0-1-2, 3-1-2-3, or 4-2-1-2-3.
The notional procurement profiles in Table 5 avoid such profiles, though they all
drop to zero boats per year by the late 2020s.
Other Defense Spending Priorities.  A fifth factor to consider in
determining the rate at which Virginia-class submarines should be procured in future
years is the need for the Department of the Navy, and DOD generally, to provide
funding for various programs other than submarine procurement within a budget of
a certain size.  Starting within the Navy’s shipbuilding budget and moving outward,
examples of such defense spending priorities include, among other things, the
following:
! procurement of other kinds of Navy ships, including aircraft carriers,
DD(X) destroyers, CG(X) cruisers, Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs),
amphibious ships, Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ships, and
other auxiliary and support ships;
! procurement of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft such as F/A-18E/F
strike fighters, F-35 Joint Strike Fighters (JSFs), V-22 tilt-rotor
aircraft, and helicopters;
! procurement of Navy and Marine Corps unmanned vehicles;
! procurement of Marine Corps ground combat equipment;
! procurement of Navy and Marine Corps missiles and other
munitions;
! Navy and Marine Corps research and development programs;
! Navy and Marine Corps operation and maintenance (O&M) funding;
! pay and benefits for Navy and Marine Corps personnel;
! analogous spending priorities for the Army, the Air Force, and the
Missile Defense Agency;
! national ISR systems; and
! programs, otherwise not included above, that support the war on
terrorism.
In considering these other defense spending priorities, a key question is how the
risks of procuring fewer SSNs than preferred might compare to the risks of providing
less funding than desired for one or more of these other priorities.
Joint-Production Arrangement
Should the current joint-production arrangement for building Virginia-class
submarines be continued or altered?
Potential Production Approaches.  Judgments about the potential
procurement rate for Virginia-class submarines in future years could influence views
on the approach that should be used to build them.  There are at least six potential
approaches for building Virginia-class submarines:
! the current two-yard, joint-production approach;
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! a variant of the current two-yard, joint-production approach under
which certain portions of the process for building each submarine
would be competed between the two yards;
! a two-yard, separate-production strategy under which complete
Virginia-class submarines would be built at both GD/EB and
NGNN, with construction contracts for individual submarines
allocated to the yards either competitively or without the use of
competition;
! a one-yard production strategy under which construction of Virginia-
class submarines would be consolidated at GD/EB;
! a one-yard production strategy, under which construction of
Virginia-class submarines would be consolidated at NGNN; and
! a strategy under which parts for each submarine would be built at
both GD/EB and NGNN, but final assembly and testing of the
submarines would be consolidated at either GD/EB or NGNN.
Navy Statements in 2003 about Potential Alternatives.  In March and
April 2003, at a time when the Navy was concerned about rising procurement costs
for Virginia-class submarines, the Navy suggested that it was not necessarily
permanently committed to the current joint-production arrangement and was open to
considering alternative approaches that might reduce costs.  A March 17, 2003 press
report stated:
To control rising costs in the Virginia-class submarine program, the Navy
is negotiating down expensive bids submitted by General Dynamics and
Northrop Grumman for yet-to-be-built subs and might even start competing work
currently shared between the two companies, according to Navy acquisition
executive John Young.
In a March 10 interview with Inside the Navy, Young indicated the Navy
might rethink the current arrangement that divides work between GD’s Electric
Boat in Groton, CT, and Northrop’s Newport News, VA, shipyard. While
negotiations with the companies are proceeding well, Young said he would like
to see industry’s bids for future sub construction decrease even further, below the
program office’s estimate.
“In my mind, everything is on the table,” Young said. “Are there ways to
compete any common work between the yards? Does it make sense at these rates
of production to continue to have both yards doing final assembly? I’ve got to
look at every tool I have. In the end, we may say, we’ve got it right. But we are
going to . . . work very hard at continuing to bring down the costs because we’re
doing that in every program.”84
A follow-on article published March 24, 2003, stated that
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a Navy official told [Inside the Navy] it could be challenging to inject such
competition into the program, because it would mean modifying the 1997
teaming arrangement between the Navy and the companies. Modifying the
arrangement is possible, but only with the consent of both companies, said the
official.
Further, if the Navy decided to compete specific, common work in the
program, it could well mean only one company would retain the capability to do
that kind of work once a winner was selected, the official noted. 
Young is considering numerous possible options, fully aware some challenges
could be involved, the official said.85
At an April 3, 2003 hearing before the Projection Forces subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee, Secretary Young was asked by Representative
Simmons to comment on the current two-yard, joint-production arrangement for
building Virginia-class submarines.  Young stated in response:
I am not prepared [to say] any teaming agreement is in jeopardy. I mean, in
fact, as you well know, to build a Virginia class [submarine] right now, it is
critical to have both companies providing parts of that submarine.
Having said that, though, as you know also, our initial bids on the next
block of Virginia classes was substantially higher than the resources the Navy
had available at that point in time.  I feel it is incumbent on me and my
responsibilities to you and the department to look at every option to build those
submarines and build them in a way that makes it more affordable to the
department.
Hopefully, any of those tools that we might apply to the program can be
executed within the teaming agreement.  But I do have, I think, a requirement to
look very hard at trying to get an efficient build process.86
An April 11, 2003 press report stated:
The Navy’s top weapons buyer wants to re-examine the teaming deal
between the nation’s only two submarine builders to see whether there’s a way
to cut costs.
With a contract for a fifth Virginia-class sub still on hold as negotiations
continue on a long-term purchase plan, the Navy is looking for “adjustments” in
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the partnership between Northrop Grumman Newport News and General
Dynamics Corp.’s Electric Boat shipyard, which jointly build all attack subs.
“This program has grown 24 percent in cost, and my job is to bring the cost
down,” said John J. Young, the Navy’s assistant secretary for research,
development and acquisition. “If the teaming agreement is an impediment to that,
we ought to at least talk about it.”
Young made clear that the teaming arrangement, begun in 1998, is sure to
continue in some form because it’s no longer practical to consider building all
subs at a single shipyard.
Each yard now specializes in building particular parts of subs. Transferring
all that expertise to a single shipyard would be costly, he said.
“Moving total construction to a single yard is not even viable at this point
in the program,” Young said in an interview Thursday.
But in the first sign of discontent with a teaming deal that has largely
escaped criticism, Young said he wanted to know whether different methods of
building the subs would cut costs.
Among the options, he said, is ending the practice of alternating the
assembly of subs between the two yards. Instead, one yard would be responsible
for all assembly work.
“I think there are inefficiencies in the teaming agreement that the
companies are trying to work through,” he said. “Is there a more efficient way?
I’m not prepared to say I have an answer. We’re going to at least have the
discussion.”87
An April 16, 2003 press report stated:
The US Navy’s strategy for building and acquiring Virginia-class
nuclear-powered attack submarines is under review following a 24% cost overrun
on the program, senior navy officials said.
The new strategy is based on lowering costs by trying to obtain a multi-year
procurement contract and possibly reconsidering whether to build the submarines
at a single yard....
In [negotiations with industry aimed at reducing costs], Young has said,
“everything is on the table.” That, [Vice Admiral Philip] Balisle added, “includes
the possibility of competing any common work between the shipyards and doing
final assembly at one rather than both yards.” However, Young later cautioned,
“I’m not prepared to say the teaming agreement is in jeopardy.”88
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Officials from General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman, when asked about
the possibility of altering the joint-production approach, stated that the approach was
working well and expressed skepticism about introducing competition into the
arrangement.89
1997 Navy Cost Estimate for Some Approaches.  In 1997, when the
Navy was seeking congressional approval for the current joint-production
arrangement, the Navy testified that the procurement cost of Virginia-class
submarines under this arrangement would be greater than under a one-yard
production approach, but less than under the two-yard, separate-production approach.
Specifically, the Navy testified that the procurement cost of the fifth boat in the class
(the boat used to benchmark the cost of follow-on boats in the program), in constant
FY1995 dollars, would be as follows:
! about $1.55 billion under a one-yard production strategy;
! about $1.65 billion, plus or minus $50 million, under a two-yard,
joint-production strategy; and
! about $1.8 billion under a two-yard, separate-production strategy.90
The Navy, in other words, stated in 1997 that, relative to the one-yard approach,
the premium for adopting the joint-production approach would be about $100 million
(plus or minus $50 million) per boat, while the premium for adopting the two-yard,
separate-production approach would be about $250 million per boat.  In percentage
terms, these premiums were equivalent to about 6.5% (plus or minus about 3.2
percentage points) and 16%, respectively, in additional procurement costs.  When
converted into constant FY2005 dollars, these figures become about $114 million
(plus or minus $57 million) and $284 million, respectively. 
Compared to the one-yard approach, the estimated premium for the joint-
production approach was due to costs for maintaining more than one complete
submarine production line between the two yards (i.e., some overlapping capabilities
in the areas of reactor compartment construction and final assembly and testing),
reduced rates of learning at each yard for building the reactor compartments and
performing final assembly and testing of each boat, costs of transporting submarine
sections and personnel back and forth between the two yards, and costs for the Navy
of supervising submarine construction at two yards.  The estimated premium for the
two-yard, separate-production approach was due to costs for maintaining a complete
submarine production line at each yard, reduced rates of learning at each yard for the
entire process of building the submarines, and costs for the Navy of supervising
submarine construction at two yards.
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Estimate for One-Yard Strategy.  It was not clear whether the Navy’s 1997
estimated cost for a one-yard strategy was based on the one yard being GD/EB or
NGNN.  The Navy’s originally intended production strategy for the Virginia-class,
however, was to build at least the first two Virginia-class submarines at GD/EB.  In
light of this earlier proposed strategy, the Navy’s estimate for a one-yard approach
might have been based on the one yard being GD/EB.  As discussed below, however,
a one-yard strategy using NGNN might be less expensive than a one-yard strategy
using GD/EB.  If so, and if the Navy’s 1997 estimate for a one-yard strategy was
based on the one yard being GD/EB, then an alternate estimate based on the one yard
being NGNN might have led, other things held equal, to a greater difference in
estimated costs between the  one-yard strategy and the strategies involving two yards.
Estimate for Two-Yard, Separate-Production Strategy.  The Navy in
1997 acknowledged that using competition in the awarding of submarine
construction costs could help constrain costs and thereby possibly reduce the
premium for pursuing the two-yard, separate-production approach.  The Navy stated,
however, that using competition would not be feasible in the near term because it
would be “many years into the future” before the attack submarine procurement rate
would rise above one per year.91
The Navy in 1996 testified that the minimum procurement rate for maintaining
meaningful competition between the two yards for submarine construction contracts
would be 1.5 boats per year.  At this rate, the Navy testified,  the Navy could hold a
competition every other year by combining two years’ worth of procurement (i.e.,
three boats), allocating one boat to each yard, and having the yards compete for the
third boat.92  A higher procurement rate, such as three boats per year, would be
needed to support competition on an annual basis.
At this point, however, even if the submarine procurement rate were increased
to 1.5 or more boats per year, it might be difficult to resume the use of competition
under a two-yard, separate-production arrangement in a manner that would be fair to
both yards, because the joint-production arrangement has been in effect since 1997
and the two yards have now shared many of their submarine production trade secrets
with one another.
CRS-51
93 Spoken testimony of Admiral Butler at the hearing.
Real-World Experience Since 1997.  Whether the premium for the joint-
production arrangement has turned out to be greater than, less than, or about equal
to the Navy’s 1997 estimate of $114 million (plus or minus $57 million) per boat in
FY2005 dollars is unclear, because all Virginia-class boats have been built under the
joint-production arrangement and no real-world data is available on the cost to build
Virginia-class boats under a one-yard arrangement.
Virginia-class boats, however, have turned out to be more expensive to build
than originally estimated.  The estimated unit cost of $1.65 billion in constant
FY1995 dollars for the joint-production arrangement is equivalent to about $1.9
billion in FY2005 dollars.  The unit procurement cost of the Virginia-class, however,
is now about $2.3 billion in constant FY2005 dollars, or about 21% greater than the
$1.9-billion figure.  If the premium for the joint-production arrangement is
proportional to other costs for building the submarine, then the premium for the joint-
production arrangement may be about 21% higher than originally estimated, or
roughly $138 million (plus or minus $69 million) in FY2005 dollars.
2005 Navy Statement Regarding Joint-Production Cost.  At a June 13,
2005, hearing of the House Armed Services Committee on the submarine force held
at the Naval Submarine Base in New London, CT, Rear Admiral John D. Butler
stated that building Virginia-class submarines under the joint-production arrangement
rather than in a single yard was adding about $200 million to the cost of each
submarine.93
Arguments for Alternative Approaches.  Below are potential arguments
that can be made in favor of each of the six potential production approaches listed
above.
Current Two-Yard, Joint-Production Approach.  Supporters could argue
that the current two-yard, joint-production approach is less expensive than a two-
yard, separate-production approach, as indicated in the Navy’s 1997 estimate.
Supporters could argue that introducing competition into the current joint-
production approach for producing certain submarine parts might not necessarily
reduce costs because it could compel the yards to maintain additional production
equipment, complicate the yards’ ability to plan their production activities, and make
the process for building and assembling the submarines less uniform from one boat
to the next.
Supporters could argue that, compared to a one-yard approach, the current two-
yard, joint-production approach offers the following potential benefits:
! It permits the Navy to use submarine production costs, production
quality, and schedule adherence at one yard to be used as a
benchmark for evaluating submarine production costs, production
quality, and schedule adherence at the other yard, giving the
government some leverage in achieving good results in submarine
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construction work at both yards even though competition is not
being used in the awarding of submarine construction contracts.
! It could ease the task of accommodating an increase in the
submarine procurement rate by spreading the challenge of hiring,
training, and supervising new workers over two companies and two
regional labor markets.
! It permits a sustained procurement rate of four submarines per year
without compelling GD/EB to put its old inclined building ways
back into production (if the alternative would have been to have
GD/EB be the sole yard producing submarines), and with less risk
of straining supervisory skills at either GD/EB or NGNN.
! It preserves a potential for returning to two-yard, separate-production
for submarines, and for using competition in awarding submarine
construction contracts, should the submarine procurement rate
increase to a level sufficient to support two-yard, separate-
production, and to maintain effective competition.  (As mentioned
earlier, however, even if the procurement rate increases to a level
sufficient for effective competition, the sharing of trade secrets
between the two yards during the period of joint production may
make it difficult to resume competition in a manner that is fair to
both yards.)
! It would permit the United States to continue building submarines
at one yard even if the other yard is rendered incapable of building
submarines permanently or for a sustained period of time by a
catastrophic event of some kind.94
! It broadens the geographic base of support for procurement of
submarines.
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Two-Yard, Joint Production with Some Competition.  Supporters could
argue that a two-yard, joint-production approach with competition for certain
portions of the process for building the submarines would:
! be less expensive than a two-yard, separate-production approach, as
implied by the Navy’s 1997 estimate,
! preserve all the potential benefits, compared to a one-yard approach,
of the current two-yard, joint-production approach, and
! potentially reduce costs for building certain parts, and
! broaden the Navy’s ability to use submarine production costs,
production quality, and schedule adherence at one yard to be used as
a benchmark for evaluating submarine production costs, production
quality, and schedule adherence at the other yard.
Two-Yard, Separate Production.  Supporters could argue that compared
to a one-yard approach, a two-yard, separate-production approach would  offer all the
potential benefits of a two-yard, joint-production approach, and that compared to a
two-yard, joint-production approach, it would offer the following additional potential
benefits:
! It would more significantly broaden the Navy’s ability to use
submarine production costs, production quality, and schedule
adherence at one yard to be used as a benchmark for evaluating
submarine production costs, production quality, and schedule
adherence at the other yard.
! It could permit the current sharing of trade secrets by the two yards
to end, which could make it easier at some point further in the
future, should the submarine procurement rate increase to a level
sufficient to maintain effective competition, to implement, in a
manner that is fair to both yards, a decision to resume using
competition in awarding submarine construction contracts.
One-Yard Production at GD/EB.  Consolidating submarine production at
GD/EB would keep two shipyards involved in building nuclear-powered warships
of some kind, with one yard (GD/EB) building submarines and the other yard
(NGNN) building aircraft carriers.
Supporters of this approach could argue that it would be less expensive than a
two-yard approach for building Virginia-class submarines, as indicated in the Navy’s
1997 estimate.
Supporters could argue that, compared to the option of consolidating submarine
construction at NGNN, this option offers the following potential benefits:
! It would permit work relating to nuclear propulsion plants at one
yard to be used as a benchmark for evaluating somewhat similar
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work at the other yard, giving the government some potential
leverage in maintaining good results in nuclear-propulsion-plant-
related work at both yards.
! It would maintain nuclear-propulsion-plant-related skills at both
yards, making it possible for one yard to assist the other, when
needed, in nuclear-propulsion-plant-related work.95
! It would preserve a potential for returning to two-yard, joint-
production or two-yard, separate-production for submarines, and (in
the latter case) for resuming competition in awarding submarine
construction contracts, should the submarine procurement rate
increase to a level sufficient to support two-yard production and to
maintain effective competition.  Restoring submarine production at
NGNN, however, could take many years and considerable capital
investment, particularly if many years had passed since NGNN had
last built submarines.
! It would permit the United States to continue building nuclear
propulsion plants at one yard even if the other yard is rendered
incapable of doing this work permanently or for a sustained period
of time by a catastrophic event of some kind.
! It broadens the geographic base of support for procurement of
nuclear-powered warships.
One-Yard Production at NGNN.  Since submarine design, engineering, and
construction is GD/EB’s primary business, consolidating submarine production at
NGNN could lead to the closure of GD/EB or to its conversion into a primarily
design and engineering activity.
Supporters of this option could argue that it would be less expensive than
consolidating submarine production at GD/EB for at least two reasons:
! It would permit the country’s nuclear-powered-ship construction
capacity to be consolidated into a single facility, reducing the
shipyard fixed overhead costs associated with building nuclear-
powered ships.
! It would reduce the number of sites at which the U.S. Navy needs to
supervise nuclear-propulsion-plant construction work.
Two-Yard Parts Production, One-Yard Final Assembly.  Under this
approach, production of parts for each submarine would continue at both GD/EB and
NGNN, but final assembly and testing of the submarines would be consolidated at
either GD/EB or NGNN.  If final assembly and testing is consolidated at NGNN, then
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one potential approach that some observers have mentioned would be to produce
GD/EB’s parts at GD/EB’s hull cylinder section construction facility at Quonset
Point, RI and either close down GD/EB’s main assembly  facility at Groton or
convert it into primarily a submarine design and engineering activity.
Supporters of producing submarine parts for each submarine at both yards while
consolidating final assembly and testing at either GD/EB or NGNN could argue that
it would offer some of the potential cost reductions of a one-yard strategy while
preserving some of the benefits of a two-yard strategy.
Questions for Congress.  Potential questions for Congress regarding the
approach used for building Virginia-class submarines include the following:
! Does the Navy have an up-to-date estimate of the per-boat premium
for building Virginia-class boats under the current two-yard, joint-
production arrangement rather than under a one-yard approach, and
if so, what is it?
! Is the Navy still open, as it appears to have been in 2003, to
considering alternatives to the current joint-production arrangement?
! What is the Navy’s view on how the potential future submarine
procurement rate relates to the kind of production arrangement that
should be used, and if so, what is it?  What is the Navy’s view of
how the costs and benefits of potential approaches compare at
various potential future procurement rates?
Possibility of Designing a New Kind of Attack Submarine
Should the Navy start design work now on a new kind of attack submarine?
Options for a New-Design Submarine.  Since late 2004-early 2005, two
options have emerged for designing and procuring a new type of attack submarine.
One option involves designing a non-nuclear-powered submarine equipped with an
air-independent propulsion (AIP) system that could be procured in tandem with
Virginia-class SSNs.  The other option involves designing a reduced-cost SSN using
new “Tango Bravo” technologies being developed by the Navy that would be
procured as a successor to the Virginia-class design.  Some or all of $600-million
fund included in the FY2006-FY2011 FYDP for “a future undersea superiority
system” could be used to help finance either option.
AIP-Equipped Non-Nuclear-Powered Submarine.  A February 2005
report to Congress by DOD’s Office of Force Transformation (OFT) proposed a
future Navy consisting of several new kinds of ships, including AIP-equipped non-
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nuclear-powered submarines.96  AIP-equipped submarines are currently being
acquired by certain foreign navies.
An AIP system such as a fuel-cell or closed-cycle diesel engine extends the
stationary or low-speed submerged endurance of a non-nuclear-powered submarine.
A conventional diesel-electric submarine has a stationary or low-speed submerged
endurance of a few days, while an AIP-equipped submarine may have a stationary or
low-speed submerged endurance of up to two or three weeks.
An AIP system does not, however, significantly increase the high-speed
submerged endurance of a non-nuclear-powered submarine.  A non-nuclear-powered
submarine, whether equipped with a conventional diesel-electric propulsion system
or an AIP system, has a high-speed submerged endurance of perhaps 1 to 3 hours, a
performance limited by the electrical storage capacity of the submarine’s batteries,
which are exhausted quickly at high speed.
In contrast, a nuclear-powered submarine’s submerged endurance, at any speed,
tends to be limited by the amount of food that it can carry.  In practice, this means
that a nuclear-powered submarine can remain submerged for weeks or months at a
time, operating at high speeds whenever needed.
AIP submarines could be procured in tandem with Virginia-class boats.  One
possibility, for example, would be to procure one Virginia-class boat plus one or
more AIP submarines each year.
Reduced-Cost “Tango Bravo” SSN.  The Virginia class was designed in
the early to mid-1990s, using technologies that were available at the time.  New
technologies that have emerged since that time may now permit the design of a new
SSN that is substantially less expensive than the Virginia-class design, but equivalent
in capability.  The Navy and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) are now pursuing the development of these technologies under a program
called Tango Bravo, a name derived from the initial letters of the term “technology
barriers.”  As described by the Navy,
TANGO BRAVO will execute a technology demonstration program to enable
design options for a reduced-size submarine with equivalent capability as the
VIRGINIA Class design.  Implicit in this focus is the goal to reduce platform
infrastructure and, ultimately, the cost of future design and production.
Additionally, reduced platform infrastructure provides the opportunity for greater
payload volume.
The intent of this collaborative effort is to overcome selected technology barriers
that are judged to have a significant impact on submarine platform infrastructure
cost.  Specifically, DARPA and the Navy will jointly formulate technical
objectives for critical technology demonstrations in (a) shaftless propulsion, (b)
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external weapons, (c) conformal alternatives to the existing spherical array, (d)
technologies that eliminate or substantially simplify existing submarine systems,
and (e) automation to reduce crew workload for standard tasks.97
Some Navy and industry officials believe that if these technologies are
developed, it would be possible to design a new submarine equivalent in capability
to the Virginia class, but with a procurement cost of perhaps 75% that of the Virginia
class.  Such a submarine could more easily be procured within available resources
at a rate of two per year, which, as discussed earlier, is a rate that the Navy would
need to start in FY2012 or FY2013, and sustain for a period of about 12 years, to
avoid having the SSN force drop below 40 boats.
Consequently, as an alternative to the option of procuring AIP submarines,
another option would be to start design work now on a new “Tango Bravo” SSN.
The goal of such an effort could be to produce an SSN design with capability
equivalent to that of Virginia-class and a procurement cost that is 75% that of the
Virginia class.  The idea of designing a submarine with these features has been
discussed by Navy and industry officials.  Under this option, Virginia-class
procurement could continue at one per year until the Tango Bravo submarine was
ready for procurement, at which point Virginia-class procurement would end, and
procurement of the Tango Bravo submarine would begin.
If design work on a Tango Bravo submarine is begun now and pursued in a
concerted manner, the first Tango Bravo submarine might be ready for procurement
by FY2011.  (Some industry officials believe that under ideal program conditions, the
lead ship could be procured earlier than FY2011; conversely, some Navy officials
believe the lead ship might not be ready for procurement until after FY2011.)  If the
lead ship is procured in FY2011, then the procurement rate could be increased to two
per year starting in FY2012 or FY2013, meeting the time line needed to avoid falling
below 40 boats.
Factors to Consider in Assessing Options.  In weighing these options
against one another, and against the option of simply continuing to procure Virginia-
class SSNs, potential factors for Congress to consider include cost, capability,
technical risk, and effect on the industrial base.  Each of these is discussed below.
Cost.  The Virginia-class program has a projected total development and design
cost (including detailed design and nonrecurring engineering work) of several billion
dollars.  An AIP submarine or Tango Bravo SSN could similarly require billions of
dollars in up-front costs to develop and design.
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The OFT report recommended substituting four AIP-submarines for one
Virginia-class submarine in each carrier strike group, suggesting that four AIP
submarines might be procured for the same cost ($2.4 billion to $3.0 billion in the
FY2006-FY2011 FYDP) as one Virginia-class submarine.  This suggests an average
unit procurement cost for an AIP submarine of roughly $600 million to $750 million
each when procured at a rate of four per year.  Although AIP submarines being built
by other countries might cost this much to procure, a U.S. Navy AIP submarine
might be built to higher capability standards and consequently cost more to procure,
possibly reducing the equal-cost ratio of substitution to three to one or possibly
something closer two to one.  If so, then the annual cost of procuring one Virginia-
class SSN plus one, two, or perhaps three AIP submarines could be equal to or less
than that of procuring two Virginia-class boats per year.
If the procurement cost of a Tango Bravo SSN were 75% that of a Virginia-class
boat, then the annual procurement cost of two Tango Bravo SSNs could be equal to
1.5 Virginia-class SSNs.
Capability.  As a consequence of their very limited high-speed submerged
endurance, non-nuclear-powered submarines, even those equipped with AIP systems,
are not well suited for submarine missions that require:
! long, completely stealthy transits from home port to the theater of
operation,
! submerged periods in the theater of operation lasting more than two
or three weeks, or
! submerged periods in the theater of operation lasting more than a
few hours or days that involve moving the submarine at something
more than low speed.
With regard to the first of the three points above, the OFT report proposes
transporting the AIP submarines into the overseas theater of operations aboard a
transport ship.98  In doing so, the OFT report accepts that the presence of a certain
number of U.S. AIP submarines in the theater of operations will become known to
others.  A potential force-multiplying attribute of having an SSN in a carrier strike
group, in contrast, is that the SSN can be detached from the strike group, and
redirected to a different theater to perform some other mission, without alerting
others to this fact.  Opposing forces in the strike group’s theater of operations could
not be sure that the SSN was not in their own area, and could therefore continue to
devote resources to detecting and countering it.  This would permit the SSN to
achieve military effects in two theaters of operation at the same time — the strike
group’s theater of operations, and the other theater to which it is sent.
With regard to the second and third points above, the effectiveness of an AIP
submarine would depend on what kinds of operations the submarine might need to
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perform on a day-to-day basis or in conflict situations while operating as part of a
forward-deployed carrier strike group.
One risk of a plan to begin procuring AIP submarines while continuing to
procure Virginia-class submarines at one per year is that financial pressures in future
years could lead to a decision to increase procurement of AIP submarines while
reducing procurement of Virginia-class submarines to something less than one per
year.  Such a decision would result in a total submarine force with more AIP
submarines and fewer SSNs than planned, and consequently with potentially
insufficient capability to meet all submarine mission requirements.  This possibility
is a principal reason why supporters of the U.S. nuclear-powered submarine fleet
traditionally have strongly resisted the idea of initiating construction of non-nuclear-
powered submarines in this country.
One risk of a plan to shift to procurement of Tango Bravo SSNs is that financial
pressures in future years could lead to a decision to limit procurement of Tango
Bravo SSNs to one per year.  If the Tango Bravo SSN were equivalent in capability
to the Virginia-class, however, this would produce a U.S. SSN force no less capable
than would have resulted if Virginia-class procurement were continued at one per
year.
Technical Risk.  Developing and designing an AIP submarine would entail
a certain amount of technical risk, particularly since the United States has not
designed and procured a non-nuclear-powered combat submarine since the 1950s.
Developing and designing a Tango Bravo SSN would similarly entail a certain
amount of technical risk, particularly with regard to maturing the Tango Bravo
technologies and incorporating them into an integrated SSN design.  The earlier the
target date for procuring the first Tango Bravo SSN, the higher the technical risk
might be.
In contrast to either of these options, simply continuing to procure Virginia-class
SSNs would likely entail substantially less technical risk, unless an attempt is made
to incorporate very substantial changes into the Virginia-class design, in which case
the differential in technical risk compared to the two new-design options might not
be as great.
Effect on Industrial Base.  The potential effect of an AIP submarine
procurement program on the U.S. submarine construction industrial base would
depend in part on where the submarines would be built.  AIP submarines could be
built at either GD/EB, NGNN, or a yard that currently does not build submarines,
such as the Ingalls shipyard at Pascagoula, MS, which forms part of Northrop
Grumman’s Ship System (NGSS) division.  Ingalls has been associated with
proposals in recent years for building non-nuclear-powered submarines for export to
foreign countries such as Taiwan.
If financial pressures in future years lead to a decision to increase procurement
of AIP submarines while reducing procurement of Virginia-class submarines to
something less than one per year, this would benefit the yard building the AIP
submarines but reduce Virginia-class construction work at GD/EB and NGNN below
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levels that might have occurred under the option of simply continuing with Virginia-
class procurement.
A Tango Bravo SSN could be built at either GD/EB, NGNN, or both, so the
potential effect of a Tango Bravo SSN program on the submarine construction
industrial base would depend in part on the acquisition strategy pursued for the
program.  If Tango Bravo SSNs were procured at a rate of two per year, this could
result in a greater total volume of SSN construction work than might have occurred
under the option of simply continuing with Virginia-class procurement.  Conversely,
if financial pressures in future years lead to a decision to limit procurement of Tango
Bravo SSNs to one per year, this could result in a lower total volume of SSN
construction work than might have occurred under the option of simply continuing
with Virginia-class procurement.
Starting design work now on a new submarine could provide near-term support
to the submarine design and engineering base and thereby help maintain that base,
addressing a concern discussed in the Background section.  An AIP submarine could
be designed at either GD/EB, NGNN, or a yard that currently does not build
submarines, such as the Ingalls.  If design work were to be done at GD/EB, NGNN,
or both, it would help maintain certain submarine design and engineering skills at one
or both of those yards.  It would not, however, maintain certain skills at those yards
related to the design and engineering of submarine nuclear propulsion plants.  If the
design were to be done at Ingalls or some other yard, it might not directly support the
maintenance of any submarine design and engineering skills at GD/EB or NGNN.
A Tango Bravo SSN could be designed by GD/EB, NGNN, or both, so the
potential effect of a Tango Bravo SSN program on the submarine design and
engineering base would depend in part on the acquisition strategy pursued for the
program.  At the yard or yards doing the design work, it would help to maintain all
skills related to the design of nuclear-powered submarines, including the design and
engineering of submarine nuclear propulsion plants.
After completing the design of an AIP submarine or Tango Bravo SSN, the
submarine design and engineering base could turn to designing the next-generation
ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), the lead ship of which might need to be procured
around FY2020.  After designing this new SSBN, the design and engineering base
could turn back to designing a follow-on attack submarine that would take advantage
of technologies even more advanced than those available today.  This sequence of
three successive submarine design projects could help maintain the submarine design
and engineering base for the next 15 or so years.
Legislative Activity for FY2006
FY2006 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 1815/S. 1042)
H.R. 1815.  Section 121 of H.R. 1815 as reported by the House Armed
Services Committee (H.Rept. 109-89 of May 20, 2005) limits the procurement cost
of the Virginia-class submarines being procured during the period FY2004-FY2008,
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which is covered by a multiyear procurement arrangement, to the costs shown in the
Navy’s FY2006 budget submission.  H.Rept. 109-89 recommends approving the
Navy’s FY2006 procurement funding request for the Virginia-class program (page
61).
Section 217 of the bill as reported directs the Navy to design and develop a new
class of nuclear-powered submarine that would be at least as capable as the Virginia
class, but dramatically less expensive.  The section states:
SEC. 217. PROGRAM TO DESIGN AND DEVELOP NEXT-GENERATION
NUCLEAR SUBMARINE.
(a) Program Required- The Secretary of the Navy shall carry out a program to
design and develop a class of nuclear submarines that will serve as a successor
to the Virginia class of nuclear submarines.
(b) Objective- The objective of the program required by subsection (a) is to
develop, for procurement beginning with fiscal year 2014, a nuclear submarine
that meets or exceeds the warfighting capability of a submarine of the Virginia
class at a cost dramatically lower than the cost of a submarine of the Virginia
class.
(c) Report — 
(1) IN GENERAL- The Secretary of the Navy shall include, with the
defense budget justification materials submitted in support of the President’s
budget for fiscal year 2007 submitted to Congress under section 1105 of title 31,
United States Code, a report on the program required by subsection (a).
(2) CONTENTS- The report shall include — 
(A) an outline of the management approach to be used in carrying out
the program;
(B) the goals for the program; and
(C) a schedule for the program.
H.Rept. 109-89 states:
This section would require the Secretary of the Navy to carry out a program
to design and develop a class of nuclear submarines that will serve as a successor
to the Virginia class of nuclear submarines.  This section would require the
Secretary to commence design of the next generation nuclear submarine to
follow the Virginia class, beginning construction in about fiscal year 2014.
The committee is aware that for the first time in 50 years, the Navy does not
have a program to develop a nuclear submarine.  Nuclear submarines, beginning
with the Nautilus, have provided unmatched, important capabilities for this
nation, and were instrumental in winning the Cold War.
In the last five decades the United States has developed an unequaled
capability to design, develop and manufacture the world’s top nuclear
submarines.  However, the committee is aware that this unique capability to
design nuclear submarines is perishable.  The recent example of the United
Kingdom’s problems with its new Astute class nuclear submarine is a clear
indication of what happens when the submarine design capability is not
maintained.
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The committee understands that the only means by which the United States
can expect to maintain its design capability is to continue to employ those
designers to develop new submarine designs.
The committee is aware that existing submarine designs have emphasized
open ocean capabilities.  While the Virginia, Seawolf, and Los Angeles classes
all operate effectively in the littoral, they were optimized for the open ocean.
The committee believes that for the foreseeable future, the littoral rather than
open ocean is the area of greatest importance.  The committee sees an
opportunity to maintain nuclear submarine design expertise developing a new
class of nuclear submarine optimized for the littoral.  This design shall make
maximum use of emerging technologies, including those spawned by the joint
Navy-Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Tango Bravo
project to develop a design optimized for littoral operations that dramatically
reduces submarine cost while providing applicable warfighting capability equal
to or greater than the Virginia class.  (Pages 257-258)
S. 1042.  The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report on S. 1042
(S.Rept. 109-69 of May 17, 2005), recommends approving the Navy’s FY2006
procurement funding request for the Virginia-class program (page 50).  In the section
on the Navy’s research and development account, the report stated:
The budget request included $163.0 million in PE [program element]
63562N for advanced submarine system development.  Of this amount, $50.0
million is for the design of a future undersea superiority system alternative to the
reduced submarine program to include consideration of new propulsion systems.
The committee is aware that this effort was directed by the Department of
Defense shortly before submission of the budget request, and that it was also
directed that these funds not just be added to existing systems.  No specific plans
on the use of these funds have been provided to the committee.
The committee has received a study on Fleet Platform Architecture that was
prepared by the Office of Force Transformation in response to section 216 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108 —
136), and is aware that this study recommends investigating alternate propulsion
systems for submarines.
In written testimony before the Subcommittee on Seapower of the
Committee on Armed Services, the Congressional Research Service addressed
alternate propulsion systems for submarines.  The air-independent propulsion
equipped non-nuclear-powered submarine would offer increased low speed
submerged endurance over the conventional diesel-electric, but comparable
submerged endurance at high speed.  The testimony concluded that these
alternatives to nuclear-powered submarines are not well suited for submarine
missions that require: (1) long, completely stealthy transits from home port to the
theater of operation; (2) submerged periods in the theater of operation lasting
more than two or three weeks; or (3) submerged periods in the theater of
operation lasting more than a few hours or days that involve moving the
submarine at something more than low speed.  The committee is concerned with
the reduced capabilities and lack of operational flexibility the submarine forces
would possess with these new propulsion systems.
The committee is also aware of and supports the “Tango Bravo” program,
being conducted jointly by the Navy and the Defense Advanced Research
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Projects Agency (DARPA).  The technologies being investigated in this program
include shaftless propulsion and weapons external to the pressure hull, all of
which could contribute to a smaller, less expensive nuclear-powered submarine
with capabilities equivalent to those of the Virginia-class submarine.
Numerous analyses have supported an attack submarine force of at least 55
boats. However, the Secretary of the Navy, in an interim report to Congress on
the annual long-range plan for the construction of naval vessels, projects that the
number of attack submarines required in the future will be between 37 and 41
boats.  The committee is concerned that this reduced number of submarines will
fall short of the number required by the combatant commanders.  The committee
believes that funds at this time should be directed at the class of submarines
currently in production, and that the production rate should be increased above
that shown in the Future Years Defense Program as soon as possible.
The committee recommends a decrease of $40.0 million in PE 63562N,
specifically in the future undersea superiority system project for development of
propulsion alternatives, and that the remaining funding be used to complement
the development of technologies being investigated in the Tango Bravo program
by DARPA.  (Pages 173-174)
The report also recommends increases for other submarine-related research and
development programs, including an additional $30 million for the multi-mission
module concept for providing Virginia-class submarines with a more flexible payload
(Pages 177-178).
FY2006 Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2863)
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 109-119 of June
10, 2005) on H.R. 2863, recommended approving the FY2006 procurement and
advance procurement funding request for the Virginia-class program.  In a section
discussing cost growth in Navy shipbuilding programs, the report noted that the
FY2006 budget includes funding to cover cost growth in the Virginia-class program
and other programs.  The report “directs the Navy to submit, not later than December
31, 2005, a plan for resolving contract cost growth on existing shipbuilding programs
such as the Virginia-class submarine and the LPD–17 [amphibious ship], including
the option of possibly converting remaining work to fixed price contracts.”  (Page
145)
